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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to study the experience in Canada with
Assurances of Voluntary Compliance (AVC), a form of administrative rem-
edy and enforcement procedure found in the trade practices legislation of
Ontario,' Alberta,2 British Columbia,3 Quebec,4 Prince Edward Island and
Newfoundland. 6 In the case of the first three jurisdictions, more than five
years have elapsed since the introduction of AVC's and the resulting pattern
of practice and application which may now be profitably analyzed on the basis
of the nearly 100 AVC's accepted to date.
Assurances of Voluntary Compliance are essentially settlement agree-
ments between the enforcement authority (the Director of Trade or Business
Practices, appointed to administer the statute) and the supplier, individual or
company, by which the latter undertakes to refrain from engaging in deceptive
or unfair conduct and frequently to reimburse designated consumers, to com-
plete contracts as originally represented and to reimburse to the Director the
costs of any investigation caused by their conduct in the first place. In return,
the Director undertakes to stop his investigation, withdraw proceedings that
he might have commenced and to let the supplier continue with his business.
The subject is closed unless the AVC is breached by the supplier in the future.1
For example, the B.C. version provides as follows:
17.(1) Where the director has reason to believe that any supplier has engaged
in, or is engaging in, any deceptive or unconscionable act or practice in connection
with a consumer transaction, the director,
(a) instead of ordering an investigation of the supplier under this Act or
taking proceedings against the supplier under this Act; and
(b) if he is satisfied that the supplier has ceased engaging in such acts or
practices,
may accept from the supplier a written undertaking or assurance in such form
and containing such terms and conditions as the director may determine, and,
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, such undertaking or assurance
may include any or all of the following terms and conditions:
(c) An undertaking to comply with the requirements of this Act and the
regulations:
(d) An undertaking to refrain from engaging in such acts or practices:
(e) An undertaking to reimburse to the consumers or class of consumers
designated in the undertaking any money, property, or other thing received
from them in connection with a consumer transaction, including money
necessarily expended in the course of making and pursuing a complaint:
(f) An undertaking that consumer transactions involving the supplier and the
I The Business Practices Act, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 131 [hereinafter the Ontario Act],
s.9.
2 The Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, as am. [hereinafter the Alberta
Act], s. 10.
3 Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, as am. [hereinafter the B.C. Act],
s. 17, previously the Trade Practices Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 96, as am., s. 15.
4 Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 9, s. 314.
5 Business Practices Act, S.P.E.I. 1977, c. 31, as am., s. 11.
6 The Trade Practices Act, S.Nfld. 1978, c. 10, s. 16.
7 B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 17.
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consumers or class of consumers designated in the undertaking will be
carried out by the supplier in accordance with terms and conditions speci-
fied in the undertaking:
(g) An undertaking to furnish a bond in accordance with the Security Bonding
Act:
(h) An undertaking to reimburse to the director the costs of any investigation,
as certified by the minister:
(i) Requirements for the form, content, and maintenance of trust accounts,
records, contracts, advertisements, or other documents or papers respecting
consumer transactions engaged in by the supplier.
(2) Where
(a) an investigation of a supplier has been ordered under section 9; or
(b) enforcement proceedings have been instituted by the director under section
16,
the director may terminate the investigation or proceeding upon the acceptance
of a written undertaking or assurance from the supplier under subsection (1).8
The statutes pursuant to which the AVC's are received are designed to
encompass a wide range of deceptive and unconscionable practices in the con-
sumer marketplace whether or not privity of contract is involved.9 The enact-
ments follow the American practice'0 of prohibiting all such acts or practices
in general terms and then enumerating a list of specific situations that are
deemed to be deceptive or unconscionable.
The availability of both private and public enforcement is another feature
of trade practices statutes." Private, consumer-initiated remedies may include
declaratory and injunctive relief, recission and punitive or exemplary damages.
Public enforcement options normally include a cease and desist power, sub-
stitute actions on behalf of consumers, provincial criminal court proceedings
and negotiated compliance pacts or AVC's.
The enforcement provisions are designed to achieve a combination of
sanctions and procedures calculated to maximize the objectives of deterrence,
compensation and efficiency. 12 The end result is an integrated sanctions net-
work in which public and private law enforcement streams have been recog-
8 ld.
0 For a comprehensive description and analysis, see Belobaba, Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection (1977), 15 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 327, particularly at 334-45; also, Panel Discussion, "Experience and Issues
under Trade Practices Legislation," in Ziegel et al., eds., Proceedings of the 7th Annual
Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, Toronto (October 21-22, 1977) (Toron-
to: Canada Law Book, 1979) [hereinafter Proceedings]. For an excellent analysis of
trade practices legislation including proposals for a model federal enactment, see
Trebilcock et al., A Study on Consumer Misleading and Unfair Trade Practices 2 Vols.
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976).
10 The "most influential American model" was the Uniform Consumer Sales Pro-
tection Act (UCSPA), 7A Uniform Laws Ann. I (Master ed., 1978), approved by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970 and by the ABA in 1972: Belobaba,
supra note 9, at 333-34.
11 Belobaba, id. at 356-74; Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 8-16, Vol. 2.
1
2 These three objectives are identified in Trebilcock, id. at 302, Vol. 1, as being
"paramount in an effective system of sanctions in the unfair trade practice context."
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nized and tapped for their respective contributions to the attainment of the
cited objectives.'-
Initially, the hopes and expectations for the non-adjudicative proceedings
of Assurances or Undertakings were significant and, common to most cases of
legislative change in Canada, they were rooted in experiences elsewhere, prin-
cipally in the United States and the United Kingdom. A brief review of these
legislative antecedents' 4 is instructive for a number of reasons that are vital
to an understanding of the present Canadian situation.
A. The American Connection
In 1925 a procedure known as stipulating'" was added to the enforcement
options of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the United States. The
practice, as one U.S. observer noted recently, was
thought to be a revolutionary departure in law enforcement.... There were strong
disagreements among the Commissioners before it was adopted, but the arguments
of greater informality, less expense, and the ability to handle more cases while
employing sanctions allegedly as satisfactory as those resulting from formal pro-
ceedings outweighed the arguments against it. Some 3,000 cases were disposed of
in this manner during the next ten years, and the proceeding was widely used,
with some modifications, until 1961.''
Formally described as a "Stipulation as to the Facts and an Agreement to
Cease and Desist," the procedure afforded persons and companies charged
with violating the law an opportunity to enter into a voluntary agreement to
cease and desist from the alleged unlawful practice. If this option was exer-
cised no complaint was filed by the FTC and no trial was held.'
7
13 Belobaba, "The Resolution of Common Law Contract Doctrinal Problems
Through Legislative and Administrative Intervention," in Reiter and Swan, eds., Studies
in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) 423 at 426-27.
14 This is hardly to suggest that the idea behind AVC's was created by legislation
or that the path of settlement or consent agreements is confined to consumer trade
practices enforcement. For example, very adept exploration of the basic enforcement
strategy was practiced by the English Poor Law Commissioners in the mid-nineteenth
century who sometimes chose to exercise their prosecutorial discretion against bringing
charges in exchange for assurances of future compliance: per Arthurs, Jonah and the
Whale: The Appearance, Disappearance, and Reappearance of Administrative Law
(1980), 30 U. of Toronto L.J. 225 at 230. Similar choice patterns are undoubtedly
evident in the administration of human rights statutes and occupational health and safety
legislation. However, in the case of consumer trade practices statutes, the AVC choice
is expressly provided for as a principal enforcement option within prescribed constraints
including the maintenance of a public record of all undertakings accepted in lieu of civil
or criminal proceedings. Only the Quebec Act omits reference to the public register of
AVC's. In their form and employment, the legislative roots of the provincial AVC's
have been more influenced directly by recent U.S. and U.K. statutes and their imple-
mentation by administrative authorities.
'5 Stipulations were initiated by amendment to the FTC Procedure and Rules of
Practice, "11 Complaints," March 17, 1925, as reported in Annual Report of the Federal
Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1925 (Washington: Gov't Print-
ing Office, 1925) at 111 (Exhibit I) and per N.Y. Tines, March 18, 1925 at 33, col. 3;
id., March 19, 1925 at 2, col. 4.
16 Wagner, The Federal Trade Commission (N.Y.: Praeger, 1971) at 65.
17 Id.
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The Stipulation, which was a matter of public record, included an agree-
ment as to the facts, including those related to jurisdiction, but it did not con-
stitute an admission by the party of engaging in any unlawful conduct. Any
violation of the Stipulation, however, rendered it admissible in any subsequent
cease and desist order proceedings. In the area of deceptive trade practices,
Stipulations were used frequently but they gave way to formal proceedings
when the alleged violation involved false advertising of foods, drugs, devices
or cosmetics deemed to be inherently dangerous.1
8
By the early 1960's, stipulating had given way to the more expeditious
and informal procedure of Assurances. Under this procedure persons and
companies undertook, in affidavit form, to refrain from engaging in the
claimed violation of the law.19 The Assurances normally included a statement
that the undertaking "is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute
an admission that the questioned acts or practices were unlawful. '20 The
affidavit itself had no legal effect. In the event the conduct was repeated, how-
18 Id. at 62-65. A more comprehensive analysis of the stipulating option in the
1925-61 period may be found in Bohen, An Analysis of the Formal and Informal En-
forcement Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission as Devices for Restraining Un-
fair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1970) at 38-46; see also 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
(C.C.H.) 9593, at 17,095.
FTC Commissioner W.E. Humphrey mounted a vociferous defence of the stipulation
procedure on several occasions soon after its adoption including these excerpts from an
address to the Annual Meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on May 20, 1925:
Another change in our rules of far reaching importance is in regard to settling
cases by stipulation. If a party is violating the anti-trust law and by stipulation
quits such practice, why is not the public as fully protected by such stipulation
as they would be by going to the expense of a trial and issuing an order
thereafter?
It seems to me that our plan of stipulation not only accomplishes all that can
be secured by trial, and saves the public expense, but that it is in harmony with
the spirit of our jurisprudence, that always holds out every inducement to settle
controversies by compromise and settlement without litigation, so long as the
public interest is protected ....
Nothing has aroused greater opposition from those who are opposed to the
change in rules than our policy of settling cases by stipulation. Our opponents say
that this should not be done; that in all cases where stipulations are warranted,
the case should proceed to trial. As I construe it, the primal duty of the Com-
mission is to protect the public from unlawful practices. If this can be accom-
plished by stipulation instead of litigation, leaving out of the question the great
cost to the taxpayer in these days of dire necessity for economy, what can be the
objection to so stipulating? I know the objection voiced by the opponents to such
procedure. They say that they want to terrorize dishonest business. To use the
stock phrase of the professional demagogue, they tell us that they want to "put
the fear of God into the hearts of the dishonest." But while we are terrorizing
the ten men in business that are dishonest, are we not at the same time terroriz-
ing the ninety men that are honestly trying to obey the law? It is absolutel"
dishonest to claim that there is a clear and distinct line between what is and
what is not unlawful under the anti-trust acts. It is, therefore, absolutely dishonest
to say that when they are violated, it is always done purposely....
I believe that the chief objection to settling cases by stipulation lies in the
fact that it tends to lessen the publicity that the demagogue and the fanatic wish
to use in their propaganda of socialism and discontent.
19 Wagner, supra note 16, at 62-66.
20 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (C.C.H.) 9591, at 17,093.
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ever, its presence would automatically result in a formal cease and desist
proceeding by the FTC.
21
Implementation guidelines were promulgated to afford suppliers a more
detailed appreciation of the procedure's ambit and likely scope for application.
Thus, AVC's were declared to be most appropriate:
(1) where the act or practice does not constitute a grave or major violation;
(2) where immediate cessation can be obtained;
(3) where the prior history of the party involved is not such as to raise any
question as to the adequacy of an assurance to prevent resumption; and
(4) where nothing is present... to raise a question of good faith.
22
Assurances were deemed to be inappropriate where the public had been the
victim of predatory conduct, fraud or serious deception or where the supplier
had acted in plain and wilful disregard of established FTC rules or industry
guidelines. In these instances, formal cease and desist orders were to be pur-
sued.
2 3
In its early years this remedy was employed frequently. The FTC's Bu-
reau of Deceptive Practices was concluding over 300 AVC's annually by the
mid-1960's. 24 At the same time criticisms started to mount and culminated in
1969 in the observations of the 'Nader Report' and the Report by the Ameri-
can Bar Association.20
Within the context of an agency portrayed as being complacent, rudder-
less and devoid of enforcement initiative, the preference for informal, nego-
tiated undertakings attracted considerable condemnation. The common
thread27 was that the FTC had used the informal procedure excessively in
order to avoid contested cases, had drafted narrow and weak undertakings and
had failed almost completely to monitor the programme of compliance out-
lined in the AVC. In pursuit of the goals of immediate cessation and adminis-
trative efficiency, the FTC had exceeded its own guidelines, leading the au-
thors of the American Bar Association Report to conclude "that the de-




As a result, the so-called "informal" AVC withered and was formally
abandoned in 1977.29 Since that time the Consent Order, a stronger version of
21 Id. at 17,094.
22 Id. at 17,093. The guidelines note that "[o]ther factors are also relevant such as
the seriousness of the violations, their scope and duration, the circumstances surround-
ing their commission, and the co-operation of the person or firm in terminating them."
(Id.)
23 Id.
.4 Figures taken from FTC Annual Reports and cited in Report of the ABA Com-
mission to Study the Federal Trade Commission (Chicago: ABA, 1969) at 22-23 [here-
inafter ABA Report].
25 Cox, Felmeth and Shulz, "The Nader Report" on the Federal Trade Commission
(N.Y.: Baron, 1969) [hereinafter Nader Report].
26 ABA Report, supra note 24.
27 Supra note 25, at 61-63 and supra note 24, at 22-25. The Nader Report at 63
concluded that "[tihe FTC's inadequate handling even of voluntary enforcement suggests
that the policy was adopted largely to mollify growing consumer indignation without
having to punish the guilty." Shades of the 1925 debate revisited!
2 8 Supra note 24, at 25.
29 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (C.C.H.) 9591, at 17,091.
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the AVC, in existence for more than two decades, has prevailed as the princi-
pal enforcement procedure employed by the Federal Trade Commission.
Under this procedureO0 the supplier is given the chance to settle the case by
negotiating a cease and desist order. The order contains a prohibition against
participation by the respondent in the practices enumerated in the order, but
it does not contain an admission that the questioned practices violate the legis-
lation. No formal adjudicative hearing is held.
Unlike the previous informal procedure, the cease and desist direction
has the same direct force and effect with respect to compliances as an order
produced by trial. Civil penalties may be imposed for violating the terms of
such an order. Moreover, once the FTC accepts the consent order agreement,
complete details are published in the Federal Register to permit interested
persons a period of sixty days to comment on the proposed order to the FTC.
In this connection, interested persons may gain access to material submitted
to the FTC by the settling respondent provided it is reasonably related to the
merits of the order and is not exempt from disclosure under The Freedom of
Information Act." After the comment period, the FTC may either withdraw
its acceptance and take such action as it deems appropriate32 or 'finalize' the
settlement by issuing the complaint together with the executed consent order
which then becomes a final order.
The vast majority of cases involving deceptive trade practices are handled
by this consent order procedure. A much smaller percentage of cases are ini-
tiated by the laying of a formal complaint which is heard by an FTC hearing
examiner whose decision is open to review by the Commission and the courts
-a protracted and expensive prospect compared to the consent order
procedure.33
It is necessary to study the FTC experience in order to comprehend the
legislative and operational beginnings in Canada of AVC's as an administra-
tive remedy in consumer protection statutes. Similarly, the Canadian legislation
has been affected significantly by model legislation proposed for and largely
30 Evident from FTC Annual Report, 1979, at 10-11, and Appendices A and B.
According to 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (C.C.H.) 9595, at 17,096:
the consent order procedure will be invoked by the agency where time, the nature
of the proceeding, and the public interest permit (62.31, 9807.31). In practice,
the vast majority of potential respondents are given the opportunity to utilize the
consent order procedure and, of this group, most do.
The consent order procedure also is available to respondents already formally
charged with violating the law. The FTC can be asked to withdraw a case from
adjudication for settlement by consent (§3.25, 9815.25).
31 FTC rule 16 C.F.R. §2.34, summarized in 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (C.C.H.) 9595,
at 17,096-97.
32 Only the FTC may withdraw its acceptance of a proposed consent agreement.
A respondent company was barred from withdrawing its consent in Johnson Products
Co. v. F.T.C., 549 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1977) notwithstanding its claim that the Com-
mission's failure to carry through with even-handed treatment of its competitors, as
originally promised, had significantly prejudiced the respondent's competitive position.
The issue of competitive inequities in the context of discretionary remedies is addressed
more fully, infra.
33 Wagner, supra note 16, at 64-71.
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adopted by state legislatures in the United States.34 One of these model acts,
the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, was approved by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970 and by the American Bar Association
in 1972.35 The UCSPA strongly endorsed the concept of AVC30 and this legis-
lation ultimately had the most direct impact on the contents of provincial legis-
lation that was enacted later in the 1970's.
B. The British Connection
Similar tendencies appeared in the United Kingdom following the pas-
sage of The Fair Trade Trading Act in 1973.37 Under the terms of this statute,
the Director General of Fair Trading was expressly authorized to "use his best
endeavours" to obtain formal assurances from businesses to refrain from per-
sistent patterns of conduct determined by the statute to be "detrimental to the
interests of consumers."3 This direction has been employed to obtain some
235 undertakings in the past seven years3" and it has prompted the present
Director General, Gordon Borrie, to describe the procedure of assurances "as
a particularly useful and successful measure" with excellent compliance results
and a high incidence of redress for aggrieved customers of the businesses in-
volved. 40
34 Belobaba, supra note 9, at 331-34. For a brief analysis of U.S. legislation at the
federal (FTC) and state levels see Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 110-19, Vol. 2.
35 7A Uniform Laws Ann. 1 (master ed. 1978) discussed in Panel Discussion,
The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act (1971-72), 27 Bus. Law 139 and criticized
as a "status quo" model act in Rice, Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act-Damages
remedy: The NCCUSL Giveth and Taketh Away (1972-73), 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 369 at
384, cited in Belobaba, id. at 333n. 33.
36 7A Uniform Laws Ann. I (master ed. 1978) §9(c).
37 The Fair Trading Act, 1973, 1973, c. 41 (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K. Act]. In
Lawson, Consumer Protection and the Office of Fair Trading (1978), 128 New L.J.
376-77, the assurance provisions in Part III are described as "a quiet success" based on
a record of "determination to see Part III put to good use" even if very few national
firms have been party to assurances-a result judged to be "surprising and regrettable"
by the commentator.
Professor Ison has criticized the failure to specify prohibited conduct in many
of the U.K. assurances and the inclination to employ AVC's "in hardcore situa-
tions of serious and repeated crime" where assurances are wrongfully "sought in
desperation from traders against whom criminal sanctions have already proved an
inadequate deterrent": Ison, Credit Marketing and Consumer Protection (London:
Croom Helm, 1979) at 396.
38 Section 34(1) of the U.K. Act, id., provides:
Where it appears to the Director that the person carrying on a business has in
the course of that business persisted in a course of conduct which-
(a) is detrimental to the interests of consumers in the United Kingdom,
whether those interests are economic interests or interests in respect of
health, safety or other matters, and
(b) in accordance with the following provisions of this section is to be regarded
as unfair to consumers,
the Director shall use his best endeavours, by communication with that person
or otherwise, to obtain from him a satisfactory written assurance that he will
refrain from continuing that course of conduct and from carrying on any
similar course of conduct in the course of that business.
39 Letter from Gordon Borrie, Director General of Fair Trading, to the author
(December 17, 1980).
40 Id. and letter from Gordon Borrie to the author (December 31, 1980).
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The authority of the Director General to accept undertakings in lieu of
formal, adjudicative proceedings was extended last April by the adoption of
the Competition Act, 1980.41 In providing for the selective investigation and
control of practices that restrict competition, the Act42 empowers this official
to publish the results of a preliminary investigation and then to accept an
undertaking from the enterprise, a procedure very similar to the FTC's pre-
complaint consent order approach. 43 Thus, the more formal alternative of
referring the matter to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for investi-
gation may be avoided.
Both countries have adopted a similar three-step procedural approach.
Once the enforcement authority has the initial grounds for believing that the
respondent business has contravened the applicable statutory standards, the
party in question is given an opportunity to give an undertaking to refrain
from engaging in the acts or practices in question. Depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the case, other elements may be sought to complete the assur-
ance, including redress or other forms of compensatory action, the modifica-
tion of contract forms, the completion of promised commitments, corrective
advertising and the submission of compliance reports for stated periods of time.
The failure to enter into an undertaking satisfactory to the enforcement
authority or a subsequent breach of an assurance will usually result in a for-
mal, adjudicative proceeding where the question of liability is directly ad-
dressed. It is clear from the design of the legislative scheme and the experience
under it, in both the U.S. and the U.K., that this recourse is taken only in a
minority of cases. For instance, there have been only seven non-compliance
proceedings arising from the 235 Assurances accepted under the Fair Trading
Act, 197344
Regarding the other situations, the Director General of Fair Trading
states that:
[a] small proportion of traders refuse to give assurances and I have to commence
proceedings in the Restrictive Practices Court or in a County Court. Very few
traders actually contest my action in Court, many of them signing assurances just
prior to the hearing or voluntarily giving undertakings under the Fair Trading
Act to the Court.
45
Indeed, the growing favour with the AVC-type procedure is underlined
by the "last chance" option employed in the Competition Act, 1980.
4
1 Earlier 47
41 Competition Act, 1980, 1980, c. 21 (U.K.) which received Royal Assent on
April 3, 1980.
42 Id., s. 4, by which the Director is required to publish such undertakings. Where
the matter was referred in the first instance to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
which issues an adverse report, the responsible Minister may ask the Director General
to seek an appropriate undertaking from the respondent enterprise or may make an
order prohibiting the practices or for remedying their adverse effects. See text accom-
panying notes 44-48, infra.
43 See 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (C.C.H.) 9595, at 17,096.
44 Letter, December 31, 1980, supra note 40.
45 Letter, supra note 39.
46 Competition Act, 1980, 1980, c. 21, s. 4 (U.K.).
47 Text accompanying note 43, supra.
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the opportunity to sign an undertaking immediately after the Director General
had published the adverse findings of his preliminary investigation was de-
scribed. A second and final opportunity is also provided for where the results
of the more formal investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
establish that the practices are not in the public interest. The responsible
Minister may either issue a cease and desist order or ask the Director General
to seek a satisfactory undertaking.4 8 This is the last time of asking, one might
say.
C. The Canadian Experience
An examination of the procedures adopted for the public enforcement of
trade or business practices legislation enacted in Canada during the 1970's
indicates that both the U.S. and the U.K. experiences exerted considerable
influence in formulating the standards adopted by the provinces.
The adoption of the AVC remedy is common to all six provincial acts
presently in force.49 It also figures prominently in government-sponsored re-
search proposals in both Saskatchewan"° and New Brunswick.51 In last minute
amendments in 1977 to the ill-fated Bill C-16, the Borrowers and Depositors
Protection Act,65 federal authorities sought to add the AVC option to the range
of enforcement choices available under that omnibus credit statute. The desire
to include the AVC option may undoubtedly be traced to the 1976 report of
an advisory task force headed by Professor Trebilcock. In recommending the
contents of a model federal trade practices statute, the task force closely fol-
lowed the provincial precedents. In an effort "to reduce reliance on formal
criminal processes,' '15 the model statute would allow a supplier to pre-empt
a criminal action where he is willing to comply with the Act in the future.6
It is clear, therefore, that in the area of public regulation concerned with
deceptive or unfair business practices, the employment of administrative rem-
edies, particularly of the AVC format, is firmly established as an integral part
48 Competition Act, 1980, 1980, c. 21, s. 9 (U.K.).
49 Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 9; Alberta Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, s. 10; B.C.
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 17; Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 9, s. 314;
Business Practices Act, S.P.E.I. 1977, c. 31, s. 11; The Trade Practices Act, S. Nfid. 1978,
c. 10, s. 13.
50 Sask. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, Proposal for a Bill on Trade Practices 1976
(Regina: Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 1976) at 21, s. 13.
51 Dore, I Third Report of the Consumer Protection Project (Fredericton: N.B.
Law Ref. Div., Consumer Protection Project, 1976).
52 Bill C-16, 1976 (30th Pan., 2d Sess.) s. 30, one of many amendments put forward
by the sponsoring Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, the Honourable Tony
Abbott. See, generally, Panel Discussion, Bill C-16, The Borrowers and Depositors
Protection Act: Retrospect and Prospects," in Proceedings, supra note 9, 87 at 87-110.
5
3 Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 323, Vol. 1.
64 Cf. the wishful statement per Lovekin Co. Ct. J. in Queen v. Southdown Builders
Ltd., unreported, Feb. 6, 1981 (Peel Co. Ct.):
If it were in my power, I would have been quite satisfied to have seen this charge
withdrawn by the Crown on condition that the condominium owners be given the
ten year extended warranty coverage because the situation is not one where the
vendor deliberately supplied a defective product in a wilful sense.
Instead a $10,000 fine was levied.
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of the combination of private and public enforcement techniques. Experiences
in the United States and the United Kingdom, as is so often the case, have been
a significant factor in the reasons favouring the adoption of this alternative.
The apparent novelty of the exercise has now given way to a measure of famil-
iarity. The time is thus appropriate to study the actual pattern of practice and
application in Canada and to identify the possible lessons for legislative design.
II. GETTING THE FACTS: "PUBLIC RECORDS" IN PRACTICE
First a caveat and disclaimer about what follows. Traditionally, the legal
analyst approaches a subject field such as sales law or personal property secu-
rity law by studying the governing legislation and the reported cases. The
study of administrative remedies, at least in this case, presents fresh and often
unique challenges to the researcher in Canada. The observations made in
this paper are based on and are only as accurate as the public record which
discloses the details of accepted undertakings or assurances.
Except for Quebec, whose Act is silent on the point,55 every provincial
statute requires the maintenance of a public record of all AVC's entered into
under the legislation. 6 The interpretation of this duty in practice warrants
some comment. In Ontario, one binder containing single copies of the AVC's
is available in Toronto at the Consumer Bureau of the Ministry of Consumer
and Commercial Relations.57 In Alberta, copies are on file at each of the six
regional offices. While the term "public record" is interpreted to include
"public perusal," it does not include photocopying even at personal expense.18
This is permitted in Ontario.
As a result, the completeness of the research for this paper may well
suffer. With regard to Alberta, 'summaries' of thirty-nine of the forty-three
AVC's accepted between proclamation of the Act at the beginning of 1976
and the end of 1980 were used on the assurance that these 'summaries' are
accurate.
The Ontario record disclosed two anomalies. Notwithstanding the man-
datory direction of the Business Practices Act to maintain a record "available
for public inspection" of both AVC's and cease and desist orders,59 one of the
eight AVC entries simply informs the inquiring party that a cease and desist
order was "disposed by Agreement" and that "The Public Record is com-
posed of this document only."60 This is a most intriguing and singularly un-
helpful interpretation of a statutory obligation.
GG Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 9, s. 314.
GOAlberta Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, s. 10(5); B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s.
5(e)(iii); Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 5(c)(i). Business Practices Act, S.P.E.1.
1977, c. 31, s. 6(c)(i) and The Trade Practices Act, S.Nfld. 1978, c. 10, s. 13(6).
57 Available for perusal in the Consumer Resource Centre, 555 Yonge St., Toronto.
58 Confirmed as the prevailing administrative practice by R. Turner, the present
Director of Trade Practices (December 12, 1980).
69 S.0. 1974, c. 131, s. 5.
0 The entry refers to a cease and desist order pursuant to s. 7 issued in Re Trans-
World Dance Studio (Ont.) Dec. 30, 1975, which was "Disposed of By Agreement"
on Feb. 25, 1976 (See Table IH, No. 3). No other details are provided of either
document.
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The second weakness could have more serious, long-run repercussions
for the legality of Ontario's procedures. The Ontario Act permits the Director
to "enter into a written assurance of voluntary compliance in the prescribed
form ... ."61 Although the Act has been in force nearly six years,02 an AVC
form has yet to be determined and published as a regulation. This is obvious
the moment one studies the seven AVC's on file. Their format, language and
terms vary a great deal and betray an increasingly infrequent contact with
the remedy.63 More important, one must consider the legal force of these
AVC's in light of the failure to prescribe the form that they are to satisfy. The
statute equates accepted AVC's with orders made by the Director, the breach of
which is an offence leading to a maximum fine of $2,000 or one year's im-
prisonment or both.64 A proceeding has never been taken to enforce an AVC
in Ontario; hence, the question has not been directly addressed. Since the
last AVC accepted by the Director was in August, 1979,6 the record sug-
gests that the preparation of an AVC form will languish along with employ-
ment of the remedy by the Ontario authorities.
Records of the B.C. experience are the most accessible and comprehen-
sive of the jurisdictions. In addition to the formal public record which is avail-
able at four locations around the province, an Enforcement Report is pub-
lished at regular intervals with complete details of all enforcement proceed-
ings, judgments, orders, injunctions and AVC's under the Act. The B.C.
Act is the only provincial enactment that refers specifically to this practice.
Reports are to be published by the Director as advisable or upon the direction
of the Minister. 0 In a statute concerned with full and accurate disclosure by
businesses in the consumer marketplace, it was felt that comparable obliga-
tions should rest on the government to account regularly for the discharge of
its mandate to act in the public interest.07
The supreme irony and bitter disappointment of the Canadian scene is
that enforcement is carried on too often in an atmosphere of stealth and anony-
mity in which generalities abound, names disappear and enforcement priori-
ties, let alone activities, only infrequently come into sharp focus. The prevail-
ing failure to administer the trade practices statutes in an accessible, compre-
61 S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 9.
62 Proclaimed in force effective May 1, 1975.
03 The AVC's in question were accepted between August 27, 1975 and December
14, 1978. They vary greatly in the handling of common issues such as compliance
monitoring, effects of breach, place on the public record, etc. There is little evidence
of drafting familiarity with the features or ambit of the remedy as one would expect
over time.
64 Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 17(1) (c).
65 Re United Institute Educational Services (Ont.) Aug. 2, 1979, amending AVC
Sept. 23, 1977 (See Table III, No. 7). The most recent 'new' AVC involving Re
Cotman Transmissions (Canada) Ltd. (Ont.) was accepted Dec. 14, 1978 (See Table
III, No. 8) and is discussed at text accompanying note 109, infra.
66B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 5(d).
67 Neilson, Consumer Protection and Public Administration (1977-78), 2 Cdn. Bus.
L.J. 169 at 178-79.
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hensive and regular fashion 8 makes analysis more difficult. It is difficult to be
precise and informative about the state and adequacy of enforcement of what
has been described as the 'flagship' statute. The same might be accurately said
of the other consumer protection statutes administered by the same ministries.
Accountability has taken on a very muted and sporadic meaning. Disclosure
is for commercial, not political, markets.
Reference was made above to the B.C. provision that mandates the publi-
cation of enforcement details "from time to time as advisable, or upon the
direction of the Minister." The Enforcement Report was published every two
months for the first two years following proclamation, then they lapsed into
six month intervals and for the period between November 1978 and February
1980, there was no publication. When semi-annual publication was resumed, a
reason for the sustained silence was quickly suspected-of the twenty-four
proceedings noted, only four had been initiated during the term of the incum-
bent Minister who had taken office more than fourteen months earlier. The
other twenty actions had been launched by his predecessor and reported upon
earlier. 9
One may be forgiven for harbouring similar suspicions about the reasons
for irregular and incomplete disclosure of enforcement activity in other prov-
inces. Unencumbered by the potentially embarrassing legislative reference to
regulatory disclosure and denied adequate investigative and legal resources,
the process of quiet administration continues. At the best of times there is
likely to be little in the way of enforcement to acknowledge. The Reports may
not make for exciting reading, but they would be informative in their own way.
In Newfoundland, after waiting for a year to proclaim the 1978 Act, the
record stands at one prosecution and one order freezing assets.70 Prince Ed-
ward Island still has a clean slate for its 1977 statute.71 In Ontario, the major
activity for the past several years has been the issuance of largely uncontested
cease and desist orders. 72
In 1977, Professor Belobaba took sharp issue with Ontario's approach
to enforcement. 73 At that time, the Director explained the lack of enforcement
68 Discussed at greater length in the forthcoming Neilson, "The Future of Canadian
Consumerism: A Retrospective and Prospective View," in Proceedings of the 10th
Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, Toronto (Oct. 17-18, 1980)
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1981).
69 As reviewed in Vancouver Province, Feb. 8, 1980, Poulsen Column, referring
to the Enforcement Report just released summarizing activities between November 15,
1978-January 31, 1980.
70 Confirmed by T. Fagan, Director of Trade Practices (Dec. 16, 1980).
71 Per E. Goodwin, Director, Consumer Services Bureau (Dec. 15, 1980).
72 Compared to the 8 AVC's accepted by the Director, the public record discloses
a total of 31 cease and desist orders between commencement of the Act on May 1, 1975
and the inspection date of January 26, 1981. Details of prosecutions taken under s.
17(2) of the Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, against operators "knowing" that their
activities constitute "an unfair practice" are not required to be placed on the public
record. The most recent cease and desist order was issued on July 14, 1980.
73 Belobaba, supra note 9, at 379-81 and on the necessary link between enforce-
ment strategy, staff resources and public accountability, see also, Neilson address, quoted
in Buchwald, Consumer Protection in the Community: The Canadian Experience: An
Overview (1977-78), 2 Cdn. Bus. L.J. 182 at 204.
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particulars by stressing the Ministry's preference for mediation, warnings, in
camera conferences and educational efforts, "preventive in nature," in line
with an overall "building block approach to the statute." 74
This approach is all too prevalent in the administration of important con-
sumer statutes in this country. The building blocks end up going nowhere.
Complaint mediation is confused for the separate, public task of law enforce-
ment; opportunities for clarification and the on-going interpretation of the law
are avoided; and quiet, undisclosed settlements become the norm instead of
merely being one factor in an integrated and visible mix of private and public
remedies.
The utility of the legislation in bringing about these unpublicized settle-
ments is acknowledged openly by the provincial authorities.75 The supplier
usually agrees to refrain from continuing a practice that appears to be unlaw-
ful under the Act and may offer redress to the consumer complainant.
70 Is this
not an AVC? The answer is 'yes' and 'no'. For the affirmative, the essential
elements of a statutory AVC are there, but the legal format is not followed.
Nor are the details placed on the public record. The matter is handled privately
and they are without legal effect.
The choice to follow lies within the discretion of the administering au-
thorities. Factors that may influence its adoption include the gravity of the
violation, whether the activity has ceased, the co-operative behaviour of the
party involved, the absence of clear intent and so on. 77 Interestingly, these
74 Simpson, Panel Discussion, in Proceedings, supra note 9, 1 at 10.
75Id., in discussing the Ontario experience in 1975-77, the then Director of the
Business Practices Division reported that mediation was used successfully in 40% of
the complaints received, further evidence of the oft-cited view by complaint staff that
many informal settlements are reached via the leverage accorded by the existence of
trade practices legislation. The individual results may (or may not) be quite suitable for
the parties involved. Since comparisons are difficult, if not impossible to make, who is
to know? In the larger sense, however, the objectives of the legislation are thwarted
by these sub rosa intercessions when they become the primary application of the
statute, a process accelerated by inadequate staff resources and the absence of either
published enforcement guidelines or case reports at regular intervals. Trade practices
legislation was intended to be more than a tool for negotiating ad hoe settlements to
close consumer complaint files.
76 E.g., see Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Alberta Consuner and
Corporate Affairs, Annual Report for 1978 (Edmonton: Min. of Consumer and Cor-
porate Affairs, 1978) at 17 reporting the investigation of "636 unfair trade practices
complaints resulting in the return of $33,416.35 to aggrieved consumers."
77 In response to questions concerning 'informal' unpublicized assurances, the
Alberta Director of Trade Practices responded (December 29, 1980):
Investigations of complaints at the regional level often lead to our obtaining an
informal assurance of future compliance from the supplier who has breached the
Act. However, regional offices follow a policy of advising the. supplier that all
completed investigations are forwarded to the Director of Trade Practices for his
review, and possible further action. If the Director decides that an Undertaking
is not warranted, the Director, or Assistant Director, may reiterate the Depart-
ment's concern in a formal letter to the supplier, and confirm with that supplier
that he has provided an informal assurance of future compliance. The supplier is
also warned in this letter that any future breaches of the Act, of a similar nature,
which come to our attention will most likely lead to a request for an Undertaking
or even action by Statement of Claim.
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considerations were the principal reasons given by the FTC in the 1960's for
the acceptance of AVC's on the public record,78 the same FTC later accused
of over-using AVC's to avoid contested proceedings. 79
The accuracy of the public record thus suffers from the absence of an
undetermined but apparently sizeable number of 'negotiated settlements'. The
absence of published guidelines or procedures establishing the parameters of
this practice is commonplace in Canadian administrative practice. This factor,
combined with inadequate records of formal proceedings, complicates efforts
to evaluate the enforcement choices made in the disposition of cases coming
within the statute.
As a result, the analyst works from flawed and incomplete records. Com-
mercial reporting services limit their coverage to occasional court decisions
and the homogenized and out-of-date results found in the annual reports of
the ministries involved. In this case, many gaps in the public information base
were filled through interviews with officials in the affected provinces.
III. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
Relying upon the information available, this study focuses its attention on
some initial impressions of the pattern and pace of the Canadian experience
with AVC's since the proclamation of the first statute, the B.C. Trade Practices
Act in July 1974, followed by the Ontario statute in May 1975 and the Al-
berta version in January 1976.
Ninety formal Undertakings have been negotiated and placed on the
public record in the period up to the end of 1980. Three provinces, Alberta,
B.C. and Ontario, account for all of them. Neither Newfoundland nor P.E.I.
has sought or signed any AVC's to date.80 Quebec is in the same position
but intends to give a priority to the AVC option in 1981.81
Alberta has accepted the most undertakings of any of the provinces. Of
the forty-three it has accepted to date, twenty-three have been settled in
the past twenty-one months, three more than in the preceding thirty-six
months. British Columbia comes next with a total of twenty-six Assurances
spread over a time frame seventeen months longer than Alberta's total en-
forcement period.
In contrast to the pattern in Alberta, most of the B.C. Assurances were
signed quite soon after proclamation of the Act. Thirty-five Assurances were
recorded between August 1974 and March 1977. There was one in 1978, none
in 1979 and two in the second half of 1980. Some possible explanations for
78 Supra note 18.
7 0 Supra notes 25, 26.
80 Supra notes 70, 71.
81 Per J. Dagenais, Director of Law Enforcement, Consumer Protection Bureau,
Department of Consumer Affairs, Cooperatives and Financial Institutions (Feb. 6, 1981).
The first Quebec AVC was accepted on May 11, 1981 and involved Cablevision Na-
tionale Lte.
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these significant swings in usage are discussed below. The Alberta and B.C.
results are summarized in Tables I and II respectively.
The Ontario figures trail with a total of eight Assurances of which six
were recorded in the thirteen months beginning in August 1975. The general
results of the Ontario AVC experience may be seen in Table III.
British Columbia maintains its reputation for producing the zaniest and
most unusual cases. There is the case of the 'recycled coffin'8- in which it was
alleged that an expensive casket, sold for a funeral service and subsequent
cremation, in fact never reached the second stage. Instead it was re-painted
and sold again without the knowledge or consent of the relatives of either
deceased. An AVC was eventually signed that included the reimbursement of
nearly $1,000 to each of the estates in question.
The 'coffin' AVC followed closely upon the case of the 'crematorium and
the unsued urn' 83 about which further details are surely unnecessary. One may
assume that these two cases have laid to rest consumer complaints against
B.C.'s undertaking and funeral industries for some time.
IV. AVC TERMS AND COVERAGE IN PRACTICE
A. Introduction
It was noted8 that deterrence, compensation and efficiency were the prin-
cipal objectives in designing the AVC remedy. Neither criminal sanctions nor
civil litigation, particularly in the absence of comprehensive class action legis-
lation, was thought to satisfy all of these enforcement goals. Imaginative and
vigorous employment of the AVC, it was reasoned, would fill the gaps in an
expeditious manner, deceptive practices would be curtailed, instructive prece-
dents would accrue on the public record and collective consumer redress
would take on a meaning unknown in case-by-case adjudication. AVC's while
not the panacea, if intelligently employed, would be an essential part of the
enforcement choices. 85
Have these expectations been achieved in the Canadian experience? The
potential scope of Assurances is set forth very clearly in the B.C. provisions
recited earlier.8 6 The non-exhaustive list of terms and conditions determined
by the Director may include: an undertaking to comply with the requirements
82 Re Vernon Funeral Home Ltd. (B.C.) Sept. 23, 1975 (See Table II, No. 17).
83 Re Memorial Gardens (B.C.) Ltd., Valley View Memorial Gardens Ltd. and Thor
Industries (Canada) Ltd. (B.C.) Aug. 13, 1975 (See Table II, No. 21).
84 Supra note 12.
85 See Belobaba, supra note 9, at 369-70, "AVC's play an indispensable role in any
effective program of public enforcement of trade practices legislation. [The AVCJ is
most often a happy middle ground whereby a good faith supplier undertakes to discon-
tinue the alleged unfair trade practice and to make appropriate amends to any aggrieved
consumers; thus, the Director's office is spared the costs of protracted injunction or cease
and desist proceedings," and see authorities on U.S. states' experience cited in Belobaba,
op. cit., at 369, 312 and 370n. 313.
86 Text accompanying note 8, supra.
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of the Act and to refrain from engaging in the questioned acts or practices;
reimbursements to the consumers or class of consumers designated in the
undertaking including the costs of pursuing complaints; completion of trans-
actions in accordance with AVC terms; furnishing a bond; reimbursement of
investigative costs incurred by the Director, as certified by the Minister; and
requirements for the form, content, and maintenance of trust accounts, rec-
ords, contracts, advertisements or other documents. While the Alberta8 7 and
Ontario88 provisions are phrased in less specific language, any or all of these
features could be included in an AVC signed in either province.
The results in many cases bear out the optimistic forecasts. Direct reim-
bursement to consumers figured in exactly one-third of the B.C.8 .9 cases and
in over sixy percent of the Alberta representative case summaries made avail-
able.90 The Ontario experience has been less encouraging. The first two As-
surances9l each included a deposit of $1,000 security for customer reimburse-
ment at the discretion of the Director within the first year of each AVC's
operation. Direct, confirmed redress does not appear in any of the remaining
Ontario agreements. "'-'
The reimbursement situations ranged from single complainant cases to
class or collective recoveries. In one B.C. case, deficiency balances were cred-
ited to more than one hundred car buyers by a national finance company that
had not observed the "seize or sue" provisions of the Conditional Sales Act.1
3
B. Misleading Standard Form Contracts
In B.C., several compliance agreements involving alleged breaches of
other consumer statutes were signed. The undertakings acknowledged dealer
disclosure requirements,9 repossession obligations 5 and contract cancellation
87 Alberta Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, s. 10(1) permits the supplier to sign an under-
taking "in such form and containing such provisions as the Director, upon negotiation
with that supplier, considers proper" and which may contain "specific undertakings" to
refrain from engaging in unfair practices and to redress aggrieved consumers.
88 Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, is described as "the most deficient" provin-
cial measure in providing for guidelines as to the potential terms of AVC's. Section 9
simply refers to undertakings "as are acceptable to the Director" to which may be
added security for the reimbursement of consumers and of investigative costs: Belobaba,
supra note 9, at 370.
89 Table II.
90 Table I.
91 Re Phoenix Publishing Co. (Ont.) January 30, 1976 (See Table III, No. 2) and
Re Cashbak International Inc. (Ont.) Aug. 27, 1975 (See Table III, No. 1).
92 Table III.
93 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 70, now Sale of Goods on Condition Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.
373. Re Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd. (B.C.) June 17, 1975 (See Table II, No. 12) and
similarly Re Associates Financial Services Ltd. (B.C.) Jan. 8, 1976. (See Table II,
No. 24).
94 Re John Barnes Wholesaler (B.C.) Jan. 27, 1976 (See Table II, No. 25) (fail-
ure to disclose dealer's licence number in classified ads per Motor Vehicles Act).
95 See cases, supra note 93.
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rights.96 The undertakings are also tied to the statutory prohibition of any mis-
leading representation about rights or remedies given or protected by appli-
cable law.9
7
Soon after the enactment of the B.C. Act warnings were issued9 8 to bring
the terms of standard form contracts into line with applicable provincial legis-
lation governing a wide variety of contractual terms. This was felt necessary
because some standard form contracts employed by both national and local
firms routinely contained provisions blatantly at odds with consumer rights
and remedies guaranteed by provincial legislation. This situation was corrected
in a number of AVC cases.99 Redress was provided and new contracts com-
plying with a proper interpretation of provincial laws were put into use along
with provisions for the monitoring of their employment for up to one year.
In B.C., the Act empowers the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to pre-
scribe, "in respect of any class of supplier, the form and content of any form of
contract, notice or other document to be used in consumer transactions. ...",00
The readiness to clean up self-serving boilerplate contracts purporting to over-
ride provincial law was in direct proportion to the awareness of the potential
scope of this provision. Many changes were accomplished via negotiations
between the Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs Legal Services
Branch and relevant trade associations and their counsel.' 0 '
The intransigent attitude of several of the chartered banks took a long
time to break down. After several adverse lower court rulings' -0 2 and a great
deal of unfavourable publicity,'0 3 however, the banks modified their contracts
96 Re A-i Handyman Industries Ltd. and Kehrli (B.C.) Jan. 17, 1977 (See Table
II, No. 31) (purported waiver of Consumer Protection Act).
97 B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 3(3)(m). Although similar provisions may
be found in the Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 2(a)(xii) and the Alberta Act, S.A.
1975, c. 33, s. 4(1)(d)(xiv), comparable AVC's enforcing other consumer statutes ap-
parently have not been recorded.
98News Release, Department of Consumer Services (Aug. 30, 1974) "Businesses
Asked to Clean up Contracts by Phyllis Young" (Minister of Consumer Services)
referring to discussions held by the Director of Trade Practices with major retail and
credit trade associations since the proclamation of the Act on July 5, 1974.
99 AVC's cited, supra at notes 93, 94, 96.
100 B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 33 (n), added by S.B.C. 1975, c. 80, s. 15,
in apparent recognition of the need to control both the form and the content of standard
form contracts employed by some classes of suppliers. The power has never been used.
Perhaps the fact of its existence has had the desired effect.
101 The "Standard Contract" project continued at sporadic intervals into 1978.
102 E.g., Gettle v. Bank of Nova Scotia, unreported, (B.C. Prov. Ct.); according to
Aug. 2-Nov. 15, 1978 Enforcement Report (Victoria: Ministry of Consumer and Cor-
porate Affairs) [formerly Ministry of Consumer Services] [hereinafter Enforcement
Report], the Bank of Nova Scotia agreed to discontinue using a "complex standard
guarantee form" in its consumer credit transactions in response to complaints about the
undisclosed, open-ended indebtedness purportedly created by the fine print instrument
(at 6).
103 E.g., the outspoken remarks of T. Enemark, Deputy Minister to the 7th Annual
Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, Toronto (October 22, 1977).
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and practices to take into account, for example, personal credit reporting and
"seize or sue" laws of the province.'0
C. Curbing Undesirable Market Practices
In addition to the minimum undertaking to cease and refrain from en-
gaging in specified unfair or deceptive practices, a third or more of the AVC's
in the Canadian survey included specific commitments to change advertising,
sales practices, contract clauses, sales marketing plans and the like.1 5 Details
of these changes are provided to the Director for monitoring purposes. 0 6
Customer complaints to the businesses are to be handled in an expeditious
manner. In several B.C. and Alberta cases, it was agreed that promotional
materials would be submitted in advance to consider their compliance with the
legislation. 107
In Ontario, the United Institute, a private educational agency catering to
foreign students, agreed to refrain from inferring in its advertising government
affiliation or sponsorship and to insert clear, irrevocable rescission rights in its
enrolment contracts in block letters.' 08 Cottman Transmissions, in the single
1978 Ontario AVC, undertook to clean up a host of questionable practices, to
handle complaints promptly and to implement the AVC with their franchisees
across the province.1'0
In a twenty page B.C. Assurance, Maclean-Hunter Ltd. completely re-
vamped its door-to-door sales programme in the province. 10 The AVC in-
cluded a withdrawal by the Director of an action in the Supreme Court of Brit-
ish Columbia alleging numerous misrepresentations made by representatives of
Maclean-Hunter Ltd. with respect to the purpose of their calls and the terms
104 News Release, Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, "Banks Agree to
Review Consumer Loan Forms" (March 14, 1978) reporting that "all of the major
banks operating in B.C." had agreed to review their forms employed with their cus-
tomers to ensure their compatibility with provincial legislation governing debt collec-
tions, trade practices, financed sales and credit reporting. Constitutional considerations
were not mentioned.
105 E.g., Re Don Mills Jaycees (Ont.) Jan. 5, 1977 (See Table I1, No. 4) (a circus
promotion/solicitation scheme); Vacuum seller's 'consumer survey' sales plan (Alta.)
(See Table I, No. 6); Re Comor Sports Centre Ltd. (B.C.) Dec. 3, 1975 (See Table
II, No. 22) (dealing with questionable 'regular' price claims).
106 Compliance reports submitted at regular intervals for periods of up to a year
following acceptance of the AVC are quite common. In Re S.S. Kresge Co. Ltd. (B.C.)
Feb. 19, 1976 (See Table II, No. 26), involving alleged sales of returned appliances as
new items, the supplier promised, inter alia, until Jan. 1, 1978, to "submit to the Direc-
tor in advance of their use, all advertising and promotional materials and procedures to
be used in connection with the sale of previously sold articles.... and further forthwith
upon the request by the Director to provide a written report giving details of its com-
pliance with this undertaking."
107 E.g., 'Warehouse' furniture store advertising (Alta.) (See Table I, No. 4); Re
Metro Toyota Ltd. (B.C.) March 11, 1975 (See Table II, No. 6) (auto lease claims).
108 Re United Institute Educational Services, supra note 65.
109 Re Cottman Transmissions (Canada) Ltd., supra note 65.
110 Re Maclean-Hunter Ltd. (B.C.) Feb. 26, 1976 (See Table III, No. 27).
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of the subscriptions being sold. The company paid $1,000 towards the reim-
bursement of investigative and legal costs and entered into a $10,000 trust
agreement to furnish compliance security for a three year period.
D. Consumer Reimbursement
A major case in Alberta involved an aggressive home renovator and
building supplies dealer."' They undertook to stop high pressure exploitation
of elderly homeowners, to cancel approximately $21,000 worth of unperform-
ed contracts and to return over $5,000 in deposits placed with the firm.
In another case, which nicely illustrates the integration of public remedies,
an Undertaking was given by a stereo and appliance retailer to reimburse cus-
tomers who had been mislead by a credit voucher scheme tied to fictitious
'regular' prices ."12 Within a week of giving the Undertaking, the operator
closed down his business. Immediately the Director successfully applied for an
Order freezing the store's assets. As a result, $30,000 in cash and goods were
tied up. The Order was vacated at a later date in favour of the establishment
of a $10,000 trust to satisfy more than 100 claims.
The result of that case recalls an analogous situation that arose in B.C.
in 1976 where the Director, within a month of obtaining an interim injunction
against a trailer manufacturer who was misrepresenting CSA approval for its
products, returned to court to seek the appointment of a receiver-manager to
take over the company's operations in order to safeguard the property of con-
sumer creditors." 3 Again, as in the Alberta case, the manufacturer had closed
his doors and there was reason to believe that purchase deposits would be
dissipated and that customers' property would be removed.
E. Corrective Advertising
Corrective advertising was undertaken on four separate occasions, 114 all
involving the clarification of retail price claims in urban markets. In an Alberta
case, a drugstore in a national chain withdrew its Suggested List Price claims
via newspaper advertisements which also invited the public to buy the items
at cost or below cost prices. 115 Pursuant to one of the two B.C. Assurances in-
corporating corrective advertising, a major home furnishings retailer in Vic-
toria and a local radio station separately agreed to run both print and radio
corrections of misleading advertisements after it was disclosed that a "sneak
preview" sale was neither restricted nor a sale." 6 The radio station had had a
long and very close association with this particular discount house and did not
III Panther Building Supplies Ltd. (Alta.) Annual Report for 1977 (Edmonton:
Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1977) at 18 (See Table 1, No. 9).
112 Little Giant Warehouse Ltd. (Alta.) Annual Report for 1977, id. at 18-20 (See
Table , No. 13).
13 Re Apollo Trailer Mfg. Co., reported in May 4, 1976 and June 25, 1976
Enforcement Reports.
114 Sporting goods retailer (Alta.) (See Table I, No. 2) and cases cited at notes
115, 116, 118, infra.
115 National drug retailer (Alta.) (See Table I, No. 8).
116 Re The Traders Home Furnishings and Appliances Ltd. and Capitol Broadcast-
ing System Ltd. (B.C.) March 25, 1975 (See Table II, No. 7).
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seek to argue the "good faith" exception provided to the media under the B.C.
Act."i
7
The most memorable AVC calling for corrective advertising involved a
Vancouver company, also an appliances and furniture retailer,1 8 who had
been aggressively promoting its sale at bargain prices of stock purchased from
a competitor that had gone out of business. In addition to paying $2,000 to-
wards the costs of investigation, the store agreed to make a ten percent refund
to all customers who could prove that a purchase had been made during the
time of the advertisements. The offer was to be valid for sixty days and open
to monitoring by the Director. The refund offer, it was agreed, was to be
publicized in minimum one-quarter page advertisements on prime pages in
the Saturday editions of the two Vancouver dailies. The language was settled
and the advertisements appeared albeit in minute print (that would warm the
heart of the best boilerplate lawyer) surrounded by monstrous borders of
blank space. The Ministry acquiesced, not without some laughter, when the
wily retailer trotted out an advertising expert who was prepared to testify that
the eighty percent white border space was a highly successful method for
drawing attention to the refund offer in the centre of this field of snow. He did
not explain, however, why his client never again ran such an ad!
F. Recovery of Investigation Costs
The recovery of investigation costs has become a frequent item in AVC's
recorded in Alberta and B.C. but it has not emerged in any of the Ontario
Assurances despite explicit reference to that possibility in the statute. In the
British Columbia cases, the practice appears in forty percent of the AVC's
signed since September 1975 and the Alberta figures reveal a slightly higher
percentage on the basis of the representative cases provided."19
\The rising incidence of recovering investigation costs and legal expenses
involves more than a new version of the "user pay" philosophy. The practice
underlines the need to commit experienced personnel to the programme if
administrative remedies are to have their intended effect. AVC's are not to
be pursued on the basis of whim or fancy. Each statute clearly sets out the
threshold before the option of a non-adjudicated agreement may be considered
by the Director.
117 Trade Practice Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 96, s. 1(2), similar to the Ontario Act, S.O.
1974, c. 131, s. 4(a) and the Alberta Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, s. 2(4)(a). Section 1 of the
British Columbia statute was amended by S.B.C. 1975, c. 80 to place the onus on the
radio station, newspaper or other medium to obtain an exemption from any statutory
liability by proving that it had received the ad "in the ordinary course of business" and
"did not know and had no reason to suspect that its publication would amount to a
contravention" of the Act. The amendment followed the February 1975 publication
of McLeod and Dihon, A Report on the Practices, Procedures, and Standards for
Acceptance of Advertising Copy by the Media in British Columbia,. prepared for the
Minister of Consumer Services which concluded at 34, inter alia, "the 'good faith' ex-
emption accorded to the media.., has led to the 'blind faith' acceptance of ad copy
and a corresponding indifference to the argument that a duty of reasonable care rests
upon the media in this revenue-generating activity." Now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 2.
118 Re Apt. Distributors Ltd. (B.C.) Dec. 16, 1975 (See Table II, No. 23) reported
in Jan. 5, 1976 Enforcement Report.
119 See Tables I, II and III, infra.
19811
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
V. SELECTION OF THE AVC OPTION
In Ontario, the Director must believe on reasonable and probable grounds
that the supplier in question is engaged or has engaged in an unfair practice;
120
the same requirement for his issuance of a cease and desist order which could
involve review by the Commercial Registration Appeal Tribunal' 2' and, ulti-
mately, the courts. 122 The language of the Act makes it clear that acceptance
of the undertaking does not require or constitute an admission by the signing
party of engaging in an unfair practice.123 This is also the case in the B.C.
legislation, where it is sufficient for the Director to have "reason to believe"
that the supplier "has engaged in, or is engaging in, any deceptive or uncon-
scionable act or practice .... 1.24 In such cases, he may accept an AVC "in
such form and containing such terms and conditions as [he] may determine"
instead of ordering an investigation, if he is satisfied that the practices have
stopped. Similarly, the Director may terminate any investigation or declaratory
or injunctive proceeding brought by him against the supplier upon acceptance
of a satisfactory AVC. 25 The withdrawal of proceedings in the Supreme Court
of British Columbia occurred on occasions involving Maclean-Hunter 12 0 and
a large Vancouver automobile dealer.
27
In these cases, as in every case in which an AVC is given consideration as
an enforcement option, a legal opinion is on file confirming the sufficiency of
evidence to support a judicial proceeding. The Act does not distinguish be-
tween minor and major violations or suggest an order for enforcement options.
This is not to minimize the inherent presence of discretion that is involved
within any enforcement system in which judgments are made every day by
complaints officers. Senior staff may shunt prima facie violations into the in-
formal mediation pigeonhole or simply drop them altogether. Earlier, there
1 Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 9(1) refers the Director back to the s. 6(1)
terms, "[w]here the Director believes on reasonable and probable grounds that any
person is engaging or has engaged in an unfair practice....
121 Id., s. 6(5).
122 The Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 113,
as am., s. 96 provides for judicial review.
123 Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 9(1) only commits the signing party "to not
engage in the specified unfair practices after the date thereof." The B.C. Act, R.S.B.C.
1979, c. 406, s. 17(1)(b) is drafted in terms of the Director's satisfaction "that the
supplier has ceased engaging" in prescribed acts or practices. Admission by the supplier
of his participation in such conduct is not required (see text accompanying notes 189-93,
infra, for a discussion of the 1977 B.C. shift in interpretation). Cf. Alberta Act, S.A.
1975, c. 33, s. 10(1) which requires a finding (i.e. admission) that the supplier has
engaged or has been engaging in an unfair act or practice and that the supplier has
satisfied the Director that he has ceased engaging in that act or practice.
124B.C. Act, id., s. 17(1)(a) and (b).
125 Id., s. 17(2).
120 Re Maclean-Hunter Ltd., supra note 110.
127 Re Bill Docksteader Motors Ltd. and W.H. Docksteader (B.C.) Feb. 27, 1977
(See Table II, No. 33). In Re Lo-Cost Automatic Transmission Rebuilders Ltd. (B.C.)
Oct. 9, 1975 (See Table II, No. 19) a private action commenced by one of three
consumers reimbursed by reason of the AVC terms was withdrawn as a result of the
settlement.
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was reference to the alternative of 'informal settlements" 8 much favoured in
some jurisdictions. These are not part of the public record, but then 'subterra-
nean administration' is scarcely confined to the trade practices field.
The AVC's that have been signed in Canada would go siibstantially be-
yond the case guidelines developed by the Federal Trade Commission for its
own 'informal' AVC's in the 1960's.' 9 For instance, they include allegations
of both technical °30 and major"" violations. They refer to predatory conduct,
and fraud or serious deception; 132 forms of conduct determined to be inappro-
priate for an AVC by FTC guidelines. The Canadian framework is more flex-
ible in that it makes it clear that an AVC may be chosen as an alternative to
a formal cease and desist order in Ontario; 33 to declaratory or injunctive pro-
ceedings in B.C.' 34 and Alberta; 13 5 and to prosecution in both Ontario"3 and
B.C.13 7 The AVC, in other words, may be shaped to the circumstances at
hand, as a clear alternative to several kinds of court proceedings.
A. The Alberta A VC Experience
The Alberta requirements are unique and deserve particular mention.
Contrary to the provisions in B.C. and Ontario,138 or for that matter the
U.S.139 or U.K.' 4° measures, the Alberta Unfair Trade Practices Act1 4 ' calls
for the business to admit that it has been engaging in an unfair act or practice
before an AVC will be considered.
128 See text accompanying notes 54-80, supra.
129 Discussed in text accompanying notes 22-23, supra.
130 E.g., Re Empress Allabout Tours Ltd. (B.C.) Aug. 15, 1974 (See Table II, No.
1) (advertised duration of tour).
131 E.g., Re Panther Building Supplies Ltd., supra note 111 (high pressure door-
to-door selling to elderly homeowners).
132 E.g., Re Balmere Automotive Enterprises Ltd. and Gregory B'almere (B.C.)
May 18, 1976 (See Table II, No. 29) (Mr. Transmission franchisee; a veritable shop-
ping list of ripoff claims); Auto dealer case (Alta.) (See Table I, No. 16) (auto dealer's
attempt to withdraw from agreed upon sale); General Motors case (Alta.) (See Table I,
No. 21) (Undisclosed substitution of Chevrolet engines in other G.M. automobiles).
133 Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, ss. 6(1) and 9(1). By s. 9(2) an AVC accepted
by the Director "has and shall be given for all purposes of this Act the force and effect
of an order made by the Director."
134 B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 17(1)(a) permits the Director to accept an
AVC "instead of ordering an investigation of the supplier under this Act or taking
proceedings against the supplier under this Act."
135 Alberta Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, s. 12(1)(a) and (c).
130 Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 17(2).
'37 B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 25(2).
138 Discussed in text accompanying notes 123-24, and note 123, supra.
139 See discussion in text accompanying note 20, supra.
140 The Fair Trading Act, 1973, 1973, c. 41, s. 34(1) (U.K.).
141 Thus, Alberta Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, s. 10(1) provides "Where a supplier has
engaged in ... an unfair act ... [and] has satisfied the Director that he has ceased
engaging in that act ... that supplier may enter into an undertaking ... to refrain from
engaging in those acts ... that were unfair" with the consent of the Director.
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Resort to the AVC remedy in Alberta in recent years does not appear
to have been impaired or restricted by the 'admission of guilt' procedure, al-
though the compatibility of the requirement with the origins of voluntary
undertakings is open to question.
Non-compliance with the terms of an Undertaking is not an offence in
itself as it is in Ontario' 42 and B.C.14 1 Rather, the Director's remedy is to
maintain an action against the signing party under the same section that
governs actions by the Director seeking to enjoin parties who never signed an
AVC.1
44
Only one action has ever been taken to completion under this provision
in the four years since proclamation of the Alberta Act. In 1977, a Calgary
automobile dealer, Heninger Motors Ltd., breached an Undertaking given in
the previous year. Rather than enforce the AVC in a Queen's Bench action
under section 12, it was decided to allow the supplier to enter into a second
Undertaking. 4 5 In due course, this AVC was also breached and an action was
commenced against the dealer alleging an unfair trade practice in the sale of
a used automobile and breach of the two Undertakings in question. The Direc-
tor was successful in obtaining his costs of investigation and was awarded
punitive or exemplary damages amounting to $5,000.140
This result yields the equivalent of a 'provincial offences' fine with the
added fillip of costs and special damages.
The Heninger decision, perhaps more significantly, is evidence of strong
judicial support for the binding force of AVC's.1
47
The statistics by the end of 1980 stood at forty-three AVC's and one
142 Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, s. 17(l)(c).
143 B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 25(1)(d).
144 Alberta Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, s. 12(1)(b).
145 Per Assistant Director of Trade Practices in a letter to the author (Dec. 29,
1980). The second undertaking was amended (for undisclosed reasons) on June 2, 1978.
146 Director of Trade Practices v. Heninger Motors Ltd., unreported, (Calgary
docket no. 139689) March 4, 1980, (Alta. Q.B.), aff'd, unreported, (Calgary Appeal
No. 12962) Dec. 2, 1980, (Alta. C.A.), in a unanimous one page judgment refusing
to alter the trial decision in the face of "a consciously false representation" by a sales-
man acting within his delegated authority.
147 The facts in Heninger were agreed to by Counsel. Holmes J. found misrepresen-
tation as to the proper mileage on the car in question. Prior to the Director's action, the
dealer and the complainant had reached a mutually satisfactory settlement. The Court
awarded $225 in special damages to cover the Director's costs of investigation and
$5,000 in punitive or exemplary damages per s. 12(3) "taking into consideration the
one contravention of the Act proven in this case as well as the past misconduct ol the
defendant as outlined in its undertakings to desist from further unfair practices" (at 10)
[emphasis added]. Indeed, it could be argued that the $5,000 figure is almost entirely
attributable to the breached AVC's since only one of three grounds pleaded by the
Director involving the odometer misrepresentation was accepted or acted upon by
the Court and an injunction requested by the Director against the defendant was refused
because "the Act is relatively new and because it has had a rather considerable impact
on the used car sales business" (at 10). Quaere the basis for judicial notice in the first
s. 12 proceeding taken by the Director and in which witnesses were not called?
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Statement of Claim. Is one to conclude, even after deducting the two Heninger
AVC's, that ninety-seven percent of the cases coming to the Director's atten-
tion that warrant formal enforcement action end up as AVC's that are satis-
factory to the Director? This would be an incredible statistic and impossible in
practice unless the terms negotiated were so advantageous for the suppliers as
to make the AVC irresistible. What is the alternative for the supplier? Section
19 requires the Director to have the authorization of the Attorney-General
before entering into an AVC or commencing an enforcement proceeding under
section 12. As noted previously, this means that reasonable grounds must be
present to go to court if necessary.
The established practice in all three Canadian jurisdictions is for depart-
mental negotiators to initiate all AVC discussions with notice that the supplier
is being given an opportunity to consider an AVC in lieu of a formal enforce-
ment action.148 In B.C., two actions in fact had already been commenced
before AVC discussions were successful.
14:
Even if one allows for the submission of new evidence by the supplier
during the AVC negotiations which results in a reconsideration or withdrawal
of the original decision to recommend proceedings, the Alberta numbers re-
main a puzzle. The case summaries provided do not suggest soft or weak AVC
terms in comparison to B.C. or Ontario. Are Alberta businesses, in that bas-
tion of ruggedness and individualism, as compliant and submissive as the track
record indicates? Might it be that difficult cases are dropped or withdrawn?
Perhaps there is a reluctance to proceed against suppliers who, in the words of
the Director General of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom, "use negotia-
tions as a delaying tactic, hastily improve the conduct of their business.., and
then argue that there is no longer justification for seeking assurances."' 150
This enigma prompted further inquiries since the available data suggested
that AVC's were being loosely negotiated in preference to formal enforcement
before the courts, a serious charge levelled at the FTC in the 1960's.151
More questions elicited very interesting results consistent with the view
that the successful and creative use of AVC's as an administrative remedy
depends heavily on a readiness to resort to court proceedings. If the Director
does not carry through with his statutory option to test the matter in court
failing the signing on satisfactory grounds of an Assurance, then the remedy
loses all legitimacy and becomes a servile tool. It is more of an escape than an
alternative, contributes less and less to the purposes of the legislation and
reduces the opportunities for judicial development and clarification of an im-
portant enactment. Especially given the lack of accurate and accessible en-
forcement records, quiet and weak AVC bargains quickly undermine any
vestige of credibility in the statute's administration.
148 Confirmed in separate interviews with officials in Ontario, Alberta and B.C.
149 See AVC's cited in notes 126, 127, supra.
15o Supra note 40.
151 See text accompanying notes 24-28, supra.
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The new Alberta data reveals a welcome clarification of this issue.152
In the period between January 1976 and March 1979, not a single Queen's
Bench proceeding was launched and pressed to completion. The Ministry, ex-
plained a spokesman, was "still feeling its way" at the time. 15 3 The 'takeoff'
stage for the AVC in Alberta began in March 1979 and enthusiasm for the
remedy has not waned. Since March 1979, twenty-three AVC's were signed
in twenty-one months, three more than in the preceding three years. There has
been a corresponding increase in the resort to court actions under section 12.
In each case, the collapse of AVC negotiations has been the triggering factor.
Of the eleven proceedings taken, only the Heninger case has gone to judgment
after a trial on the merits and three cases have been otherwise wound up: one
became a fraud prosecution, another folded into an AVC and the third be-
came a consent judgment. Discoveries and trial hearings are proceeding in the
remaining seven cases. Both the carrot and the stick are at work.
B. Recent B.C. Trends
The adaptability of negotiated assurances to changing or novel marketing
practices is illustrated in the two most recent AVC's in British Columbia.
154
Both dealt with the aggressive promotion and sale of "time-sharing" contracts
entitling the buyer to several weeks' accommodation each year in condomin-
ium apartments in Hawaii, Nevada and other southern locations. The scope of
the operations is illustrated by the fact that the second venture involved a
mailing blitz of more than 500,000 solicitations in 1980, sufficient to reach
every other household in the southern half of the province.'15
The contracts involved would often amount to more than $6,000 up
front, plus an annual fee of $150 or more, to use a one-bedroom condominium
suite for one week a year. In the most recent Undertaking signed December
1st 1980, .the promoter, The Aloha Group, acknowledged the application of
the B.C. Act and the cancellation rights granted by the Consumer Protection
Act.156 Whether either proposition is entirely correct is possibly open to chal-
lenge since realty interests, including tenancies, would appear to be covered
by other legislation. 157 The Superintendent of Insurance, however, in a 1979
152 Provided by R. Turner, Director of Trade Practices (Feb. 4, 1981).
153 Id.
154 Re Scottish Inns of America Inc. (B.C.) Sept. 19, 1980 (See Table II, No. 38)
and Re The Aloha Group Inc. (B.C.) Jan. 6, 1981 (See Table 11, No. 39).
155 The promotion featured 6 'gifts' including a car (no one ever won it), TV sets
(one winner) and $1,000 cash (one winner): Vancouver Province, Jan. 9, 1981, Kathy
Tait Consumer Column.
156 Aloha AVC, supra note 154, preamble para. (D): "It is agreed by the parties
hereto and by the Superintendent of Insurance that the Suppliers' operations are gov-
erned by the Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Protection Act."
157 B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, applies to "consumer transactions" defined by
section 1 as the "disposition or supply of any kind of personal property" which in turn
is deemed to include chattels, services and credit, but not securities as defined by the
Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 380, s. 1 or contracts of insurance under the Insurance
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 200, s. 1. Cf. Consumer Protection Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 65,
s. 13 (1) (a) granting seven day cancellation rights under "executory contracts" involving
goods or services and the Real Estate Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 356, s. 1 by which "'real
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ruling, decided that the supplier's prospectus did not disclose an interest in
land within the meaning of the Real Estate Act.158
In the face of growing complaints of high-pressure tactics, forfeited de-
posits, foreign exchange ripoffs and non-existent gift schemes, an AVC was
fashioned which covered every facet of the marketing scheme that had been
questioned by the consumer columnists of Vancouver's two daily news-
papers. 1 9 Clear refund rights were made retroactive to January, 1980, a
seven-day cancellation clause was confirmed, overbooking was prohibited and
misleading telephone solicitations were curbed. 160
These 'time-sharing' AVC's were the first AVC's signed in British Colum-
bia in nearly eighteen months and followed a period of over three and a half
years in which only two Assurances had been recorded. The remaining thirty-
five Agreements had been negotiated in the interval between August 1974 and
February 1977.161 The reasons for the decline are found in policy announce-
ments on enforcement priorities made by the Ministry late in 1977.162 Since
those reasons address the central objectives of a diverse enforcement mech-
anism, they merit careful analysis and consideration.
Prior to the middle of 1977, the B.C. Enforcement Reports'60 disclose a
pattern of reliance on AVC's and substitute actions in terms of Director-
initiated proceedings. The latter remedy adopted a precedent from the State of
South Australiales in which the Director, with the consent of the Minister and
the consumer, is authorized to take on the carriage of the consumer's case (as
plaintiff, defendant or on appeal) "with a view to enforcing or protecting the
rights of the consumer" arising under "any enactment or law relating to the
estate? includes a leasehold, an estate or interest or charge less than the fee simple...."
The characterization of the buyer's interest under a time-sharing contract is obviously
not without difficulty. Is it a supply of personal property or an interest in land or
something of each? Unfortunately, a copy of the contract employed was not available
for closer scrutiny.
158 Aloha A VC, supra note 154, preamble para. (C): "The Superintendent of In-
surance, at the request of the Supplier, determined that the prospectus filed by the
Supplier on March 22, 1979 does not disclose an interest in land and accordingly the
Supplier's operations as disclosed in the prospectus are not governed by the Real Estate
Act."
159 Parton, "Dealing with Complaints Against Aloha," Vancouver Sun, Jan. 11,
1981 and Tait Column, Vancouver Province, Jan. 9, 1981 where a senior B.C. official
is quoted as saying that the AVC is "a very solid way" of dealing with Aloha-type
situations while acknowledging that the whole issue of growth in time-sharing operations
would probably require separate legislation "in the long term."
160 Aloha AVC, supra note 154. These are the principal commitments made by
Aloha out of a total of 13 detailed provisions.
161 See Table II.
162 Per Enemark, Panel Discussion in Proceedings, supra note 9, at 11-16 and con-
firmed by Gould, "Recent Developments in Trade Practices (1978)," in Woodsworth,
ed., Consumer Law (Vancouver: Continuing Legal Educ. Soc'y of B.C., 1979) at 53-56.
103 E.g., Enforcement Reports dated July 8, 1975; Aug. 15, 1975; Nov. 7, 1975;
Feb. 4, 1976; May 4, 1976; Aug. 24, 1976; Dec. 7, 1976.
164 Prices Act, 1948-75, R.S.S. Aust. 1975, s. 18a(2), enacted by Stat. S. Aust.
1970, c. 40, s. 6, authorizing the Commissioner for Prices and Consumer Affairs to
take on substitute actions on behalf of consumers.
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protection or interests of consumers."' ' o Approximately fifteen actions were
taken under this provision during the first three years. 166
The enforcement record was rounded out by a half-dozen injunctive or
declaratory proceedings in the Supreme Court initiated by the Director,
1 7
several freezing orders to protect consumer property'0 8 and a single instance
of prosecution against a major furniture retailer who had earlier been party to
an AVC. 169 These figures do not take into account private civil actions in-
cluding separate, successful injunctive applications by a Vancouver radio
station170 and the B.C. Branch of the Consumers' Association of Canada'
71
under section 16 of the statute. The preference for civil sanctions and remedies
in the pre-1978 period is thus amply established.
In the 1978-79 fiscal year, the pattern of enforcement choices reversed
as thirteen prosecutions were completed compared to a single AVC.172 The
eight substitute actions remained a relatively constant contributor in the year
ending March 31, 1979173 and were vigorously employed to reach a number
of settlements on behalf of consumer complainants in 1980.174
The AVC's fall from favour was forecasted in statements released by
165 B.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 24 and similarly Alberta Act, S.A. 1975,
c. 33, s. 13 but there the Director is not able to employ the action to defend the con-
sumer in proceedings commenced by a supplier. The Ontario Act does not provide for
substitutions: Belobaba, supra note 9, at 371 who describes the provision as "the single
most important administrative measure to ensure that worthwhile consumer-initiated
litigational efforts are not abandoned."
166 B.C. Dept. Consumer Services, Annual Reports for 1974-76 (Victoria: B.C.
Dept. Consumer Services).
167 Id. Particular examples would include Belmont Sales Ltd., Aug. 15, 1975,
Enforcement Report (combined substituted action and injunction application); Maclean-
Hunter Ltd., Sept. 23, 1975, Enforcement Report (interim injunction); Household
Finance Corp. of Canada, March 26, 1976, Enforcement Report (declaration).
168 E.g., Re Baillifs Sale, June 25, 1976, Enforcement Report at 4: that this marks
"the sixth time that a freezing order has been issued by the Director to prevent anyone
from dealing with the assets of a firm under investigation."
169 See Re Traders Home Furnishings and Appliances Ltd., supra note 114 and
accompanying text. The firm was convicted and fined $200: May 20, 1977, Enforcement
Report.
170 Radio NW Ltd. v. Bell-Kraft International Ltd., unreported, April 22, 1975
(B.C.S.C.), uncontested, alleging misleading affiliation claims by defendant's represen-
tatives with plaintiff's "Bridal Fair" promotion.
171Stubbe v. P.F. Collier and Sons Ltd. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 605, [1977] 3
W.W.R. 493, 30 C.P.R. (2d) 216, supplemental reasons, [1978] 3 W.W.R. 257 (B.C.S.C.).
172 B.C. Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Annual Report (Victoria:
Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1979) at 12.
173 Id.
174 E.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Feb. 1, 1980-July 23, 1980 En-
forcement Report at 3 (suit for deficiency balance notwithstanding prior repossession);
Strand Holidays (Canada) Ltd., Enforcement Report, op. cit., at 3 ($200 compensation
for each of 23 disappointed travellers plus $1,000 costs); General Motors of Canada
and Rice Chevrolet Oldsmobile Ltd., Enforcement Report, op. cit., at 4 (a total of
$4,236 to two Prince George purchasers alleging premature rusting, inadequate repairs,
plus $2,320 investigation costs).
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senior spokesmen of the Ministry commencing in October 197 7 .1T5 The re-
examination of the role of the AVC as an enforcement tool, it was announced,
had been prompted by several deficiencies identified in the remedy's deploy-
ment and effects. The results of this "accumulation of experience" in turn
supported the desirability of moving towards more criminal prosecutions as a
principal strategy of enforcement.170
As a result, the role of the Assurance was narrowed to those cases of
probable violation in which the supplier clearly demonstrated good faith, ini-
tiated the AVC request and admitted its violation of the statute. "Good
faith," as a term of art, was considered as isolated or careless misconduct or
ignorance based on established, industry-wide practice. Prosecution would be
the primary enforcement tool for the remaining cases.
177
The new policy amounted to significant de facto amendment of a statute
imprinted with a clear bias for civil proceedings. Enforcement in the provincial
criminal court was to be a last resort option.178 The limitations of a marketing
practices statute tied to the criminal law have been long recognized in the
federal experience under the Combines Investigation Act.1 79 For the better
part of a decade, efforts,180 ultimately unsuccessful, had been made in Ottawa
to escape an enforcement path that was slow and expensive, in which redress
was unavailable, and, judging by the erratic and often derisory level of fines,
deterrence elusive.'
8 '
Was this prosecution to be the basis for a Brave New World in provincial
enforcement? The discovery by April 1979' s - that thirteen prosecutions under
both the Trade Practices Act and Consumer Protection Act had yielded
175 Enemark, in Proceedings, supra note 9, plus text accompanying note 162.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 15.
178 The common thread of all the provincial statutes is the prominence given to the
government-initiated remedies and private redress actions in the basic statutory scheme.
The bias was clearly identified by the Ontario Divisional Court in Re Aamco Transmis-
sions Inc. and Simpson (1981), 29 O.R. (2d) 565 at 573, 113 D.L.R. (3d) 650 at 658,
(Div. Ct.) in the course of upholding the constitutionality of the Ontario Act in the face
of arguments that it was penal legislation, see also, Stubbe, supra note 171, at 642
(D.L.R.), 537 (W.W.R.), 254 (C.P.R.); Cohen and Ziegel, Political and Constitutional
Basis for a New Trade Practices Act (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1976)
at 28-34.
179 Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 45-46, Vol. I, describes the criminal law approach
as a "clumsy regulatory device" and recommended the restriction of the criminal sanc-
tion in more innovative forms to "situations involving fraud and negligence and as a
support measure to be invoked in the event of breach by an advertiser of other forms
of order."
180 Stanbury, Business Interests and the Reform of Canadian Competition Policy,
1971-1975 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1977) describes this with vim and vigour in
the context of competition law reform.
181 See conviction results in Annual Report, Director of Investigation and Re-
search, Combines Investigation Act, 1980 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services,
1980) and for an earlier analysis see data collected by the Law Reform Commission
of Canada in Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 105-106nn. 119-20, Vol. I.
182 Annual Report, supra note 172, at 11.
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$15,000 in fines might have been readily predicted by any novice analyst of
the subject area before the proceedings had been contemplated. According to
the new guidelines, these cases must have concentrated on wilful, flagrant,
often repetitive violations which, one might observe, carry a maximum penalty
under the Trade Practices Act of $100,000 for a convicted corporation and
$5,000 for an individual. s'8
In fairness, the 1977 policy shift betrayed several major concerns with
Assurances that were judged to override the acknowledged weaknesses of an
approach weighted towards criminal prosecutions. In particular the AVC was
characterized as a potentially unfair bargain extracted by zealous, anonymous
civil servants. The criticism was most graphically summarized in these words:
What is at issue here is not the administrator's authority to proceed; rather, it is
his authority to treat privately with an offender, to decide not to proceed in the
courts, in effect to combine the role of prosecutor and judge. It is this situation
which lays the administration open to charges of blackmailing 'innocent' business-
men into half-hearted AVC's.184
The identical accusation has recently been the subject of commentary in
the United States in connection with the vigorous use of consent decrees by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.85 Unlike the U.S. example, how-
ever, this indigenous accusation is based on inferences and suggested possibili-
ties of misbehaviour without any supporting cases or even statements on the
public record by aggrieved parties or sympathetic commentators.
It may be readily conceded that the opportunity for exercising discre-
tionary control over the choice and content of enforcement options carries
with it the parallel potential for aggressive and unfair exploitation. This is a
phenomenon scarcely limited to administrative proceedings if one considers
comparable and ultimately more determinative opportunities open to prosecu-
tors in the arraignment of charges and plea bargaining.,,
The trade practices statutes require a "reasonable belief" of probable
violation before any enforcement option may be considered. According to in-
terviews and case analysis, this requirement is strictly construed by the Attor-
ney-General counsel who are consulted on each case in the three provinces in
183 D.C. Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 25(2) and (3). The highest recorded cor-
porate fine levied was $2,000 in Swan Automotive Ltd. Nov. 15, 1978-Jan. 31, 1980
Enforcement Report at 5 (failing to disclose vehicle lien to buyer), and also in West-
wood Toyota Ltd., Enforcement Report, op. cit., (refused to honour price rebate
coupon). The average level of fine reported between late 1978 and early 1981 appears
to run in the $100-$1,000 range.
184 Enemark, in Proceedings, supra note 9, at 13.
1
8 5 For a spirited account, see Bruck, "Stanley Sporkin, Waning Days for the
Zealot at the SEC," The American Lawyer, Nov. 1980, at 16-24; also Block and Barton,
Administrative Proceedings to Enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1979-80),
7 Sec. Reg. L.J. 40 and Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative
Enforcement Proceedings (1979-80), 29 Cath. Univ. of Am. L. Rev. 215 at 273-80.
180See Manning, Abuse of Power by Crown Attorneys (1979), L.S.U.C. Special
Lectures 571 and cf. the cautionary views of Verdun-Jones and Cousineau, Cleansing
the Augean Stables: A Critical Analysis of Recent Trends in the Plea Bargaining Debate
in Canada (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 227.
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question. 187 Their consent is required before any action is taken on any of the
enforcement options. To infer that the Directors have been engaged in capri-
cious acts distorts established operating checks and balances.
Indeed, it might be argued that the cautious vetting of investigated cases
has led to a largely conservative and frequently unimaginative application of
the sanctions in the Canadian experience. At any rate, the approval to go to
court is well in hand prior to any AVC negotiations. In the words of the
Alberta Director, "as administrators, we must ensure that before we attempt
to negotiate an Undertaking we are satisfied that the facts in our possession
would support a successful court action.' 8
Where the courts have been involved in Director-initiated proceedings,
there has never been the slightest suggestion that the cases have been brought
in bad faith or mounted on frivolous or vexatious grounds. In the circum-
stances, the picture or the prospect of unprincipled zealots utilizing AVC's
to vanquish bewildered traders does not correspond with Canadian practice or
experience.
If there is an air of mystery surrounding the remedy which feeds suspi-
cions about the excesses of regulatory entrepreneurs, then much of the prob-
lem has been created by the bureaucracy. Informal, off-the-record private set-
tlements are commonplace in the absence of a pre-complaint procedure. Op-
portunities for public comment on proposed Undertakings are unavailable.
The details of formal enforcement are frequently sketchy, untimely and rela-
tively inaccessible. If steps were taken to shed light on the exercise of discre-
tionary powers and the procedures or guidelines governing their employment,
the suggestions of manipulation would lose much of their force.
The restriction of B.C. Undertakings to situations in which the supplier
admitted to violating the Act did not accord with the statute's requirements.
Neither the B.C. nor the Ontario statutes require an admission of guilt from
parties signing Assurances or Undertakings,' 89 nor do the U.S. or U.K. pre-
cedents employed in their drafting. 1" The reason is obvious. The principal
attractions of the remedy to both sides are its capacity to isolate the practices
in question, to deal expeditiously with questions of redress and compensation
in a single package and to bring the matter to a clear-cut conclusion. The
remedy was not designed as an act of public contrition in which past sins are
admitted. 191
The switch to a "true confessions" interpretation in B.C. was borne out
in the first two AVC's accepted after adoption of the approach. 192 The most
187 Alberta Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33, s. 19 formally requires the prior consent of the
Attorney General before the Director is able to initiate any court proceedings or enter
into an undertaking.
188 Communication to author (Dec. 29, 1980).
189 See note and text accompanying note 138, supra.
100 See notes 139, 140 and text accompanying these notes, supra.
191 Confirmed in the author's experience in B.C. and interview with A. Coleclough,
Director, Investigation and Enforcement (Dec. 19, 1980).
192 Re North Shore Capilano Recreation Society (B.C.) April 28, 1978 (See Table
II, No. 37) and Re Scottish Inns of America, supra note 154.
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recent Assurance, however, signed by the supplier in December, 1980, re-
verted to the non-admission language found in every AVC adopted prior to
October 1977 and in circumstances virtually identical to the time-sharing
promotions involved in the immediately preceding Assurance. 
1 3
It appears that the present British Columbia trend is toward a more prag-
matic and pluralistic enforcement policy largely freed of the restrictive condi-
tions announced in 1977 and very much in the spirit of the announcement at
that time calling for periodic re-evaluation of enforcement policies.
1 4
C. Ontario's Experience with A V/C's
By comparison, it is difficult to locate a visible enforcement strategy in
the employment of administrative proceedings outside the two most-Western
provinces. The experience in Newfoundland, 1'9 Prince Edward Island'01 and
Quebec 0 7 has been so negligible as to defeat analysis. In Ontario, enforcement
has increasingly concentrated on gathering evidence for prosecutions under
the Criminal Code. 98 This is interspersed with occasional ex parte Cease and
Desist orders against marginal operators, 00 a procedure unavailable to en-
forcement authorities in B.C. and Alberta where interim injunctions must be
193 Re The Aloha Group Inc., supra note 154, accepted by the Director on Jan. 6,
1981, the supplier "without acknowledging that it had failed to comply with the Trade
Practices Act and with the Consumer Protection Act" entered into a series of under-
takings (at 3).
194 A new enforcement policy was adopted to encourage more varied use of the
civil remedies provided in the Trade Practices Act: B.C. Ministry of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs, Annual Report (Victoria: Ministry of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs, 1980) at 6.
The most recent Enforcement Report covering the period July 24, 1980-Feb. 10,
1981 records two AVC's (the 'time-sharing' cases), one substitute action and three
prosecutions: one involving a breach of the Act in the face of prior warnings; the second
concerning the sale of a used two-year old appliance as new; and the third involved
fraudulent TV repair practices as part of a 'test shopping' project conducted by the
Ministry over the past three years. The failure of criminal sanctions to address directly
the redress of aggrieved consumers was the subject of a 1980 amendment of the B.C.
Act in S.B.C. 1980, c. 5, adding s. 25.1 by which the Provincial Court may, upon
conviction of a supplier under the Act, order the payment of an amount not exceeding
the monetary jurisdiction under the Small Claims Act "as compensation for pecuniary
loss suffered by the aggrieved consumer as a result of the commission of the offence."
Interestingly, ad hoc efforts in that direction were occasionally made prior to the
amendment, viz., in R. v. Murray, discussed in Wise Construction Co., July 24, 1980-
Feb. 15, 1981, Enforcement Report at 4 (unconscionable conduct in performing house
repairs for elderly homeowners) where on appeal by the accused, the four-month
sentence ordered at trial was altered to weekend incarceration over 90 weeks, probation
for the period in question, $1,000 fine and a probation order to reimburse three con-
sumers a total of $1,750.
195 See note 70 and accompanying text, supra.
1O Supra note 71.
197 Supra note 81.
19s R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, e.g. fraud, odometer tampering and confirmed in inter-
view with A. Coleclough, Director, Investigation and Enforcement (Dec. 19, 1980).
109 See note 72 and accompanying text, supra.
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sought before the courts. The most recent Ontario AVC is dated December
1978.200 Only two Assurances have been negotiated since September 1976.201
The province's tentative attitude towards the remedy is perhaps most clearly
exemplified by the failure, since the statute's proclamation in May 1975 to
produce the required standard form or outline for compliance agreements. 202
Interviews suggest that the Ontario aversion is based on several grounds.
20 3
For instance, it is said that some AVC's in the North American experience
have been drawn in imprecise terms reflecting hasty concessions by one or
both of the sides. The net force of the Undertaking becomes too uncertain to
measure. On the other hand, efforts to stiffen the terms or to look for mini-
mum compensation too often result in protracted delay, stonewalling and weak
AVC's that appear more as partnership pacts between the Director and the
signing party rather than enforceable commitments of compliance.
These characterizations are difficult to accept. In essence, the test of the
endeavour is in the completeness of the Director's preparation, the prior dis-
closure of the procedures governing the format of, and time available for, any
negotiations and the constant readiness to let the courts settle the matter if
negotiations should be unsuccessful. Weak, imprecise and counterproductive
Assurances will go on the public record along with the more creative, imagina-
tive and comprehensive products.
The total experience is open to scrutiny. Compared to a static reliance
on standard prosecutions and quiet moral suasion, the compliance agreement
is the clearest barometer of resilient and resourceful leadership in the adminis-
tration of business practices legislation.
Part of Ontario's reluctance to adopt AVC's as an enforcement option
may be attributed to the apparent aftermath of the last Assurance recorded by
the Ministry that was signed in December 1978 by Cottman Transmissions
(Canada) Limited. The company undertook to refrain from a number of al-
legedly deceptive or unfair practices including unnecessary repairs, inaccurate
estimates, misleading advertisements and the like. Cottman also agreed that
staff would be properly trained and complaints would be handled in a reason-
able and expeditious manner.
The complaints are virtually identical to those raised in a number of
cases handled by way of Assurances and substitute actions in British Columbia
over the past several years.2 4 Hence, it is not surprising that the terms of the
20 Re Cottman Transmissions (Canada) Ltd., supra note 65.
201 See Table M.
202 See text accompanying notes 61-63, supra.
203 Interview conducted with A. Coleclough, Director, Investigation and Enforce-
ment (Dec. 19, 1980).
204 Re Lo-Cost Transmission Rebuilders Ltd., supra note 127; Victoria Automatic
Transmission Services, Feb. 4, 1976, Enforcement Report at 1-2, (substitute action);
Re Balmere Automotive Enterprises Ltd., supra note 132, (Mr. Transmission franchisee);
and separate substitute actions in Actions Against Cottman Ltd. and George Gregory
Ltd. as Aamco Transmission, Nov. 15, 1978-Jan. 31, 1980, Enforcement Report at 6
(settled on the payment of $1,000 to the consumer complainant in each case).
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Undertaking read very much like a code of good conduct for Cottman and as
a clear message to its fellow operators to measure up to the practices called
for in the AVC. Indeed, for the first time in Ontario's experience, this Agree-
ment referred specifically to its place on the public record and the intention to
circulate details to interested suppliers, a practice regularly followed in B.C.20"
and Alberta.206
Apparently the example did not have a persuasive impact on Cottman's
competitors. Within the year, notices, proposed Cease and Desist Orders and
Orders for immediate Compliance were issued by the Director to Aamco,
Mister Transmission and other operators. In September 1980, the Notices and
Orders were quashed by the Divisional Court 7 on the grounds that the
Orders were too vague to be enforced, lacked specificity and failed to comply
with the requirements of The Statutory Powers Procedure Act.2 8 The decision
is being appealed.
The Cottman and Aamco situations, it might be argued, illustrate the
AVC potential for creating competitive inequities. In succumbing to an AVC,
has not Cottman been placed at a competitive disadvantage as a result of its
commitment to observe the only enforceable Order obtained from or imposed
upon the industry?209
Surely this contention is ill-conceived. Even if the decision of the Divi-
sional Court is upheld on appeal, the result may illustrate more directly the
difficulties of framing appropriate Cease and Desist Orders210 than in defining
205 The practice has been expressly provided for in all AVC's accepted in B.C.
since Re Lo-Cost Transmission Rebuilders, id., when details are circulated to the trade,
identifying marks are usually removed since the principal intention is to use the AVC
as a form of trade rule and good practice guideline.
206 Limited in practice by the largely passive attitude of the Director to AVC
publicity reflected most graphically in the refusal to permit photocopying of Assurances
despite their being on the public record per s. 10(5) as discussed in text accompanying
note 58, supra.
207 Simpson, supra note 178.
208 S.O. 1971, c. 47.
209 Assuming, of course, strict compliance with the AVC by Cottman.
210 Apart from deciding that the Director's proposed order to cease and desist from
unfair practices under s. 6(2) of the Ontario Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131 is subject to judicial
review under s. l(f) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 48 and
confirming the constitutionality of the Ontario Act, the brunt of the decision deals with
the applicant's challenge of the specificity of the s. 6 and s. 7 notices. Despite a notice
running some 104 pages in length, the Court held that there was insufficient detail pro-
vided about particular practices alleged to be unfair within the meaning of the Act.
Thus, the Director
[i]n many cases ... does not specify what is considered to be unfair about certain
practices, nor does he'state precisely what practices the applicants should cease.
Instead, the Director describes a system of business, concludes that the system
is unfair, and proposes to make an order to cease and desist from the unfair
practices.... The applicants .... could not be expected to discern the potential
subject-matter of a written assurance of voluntary compliance, since the notice
does not set out, with any specificity, the activities that must be ceased. (Simp-
son, supra note 178, at 582 (O.R.), 667 (D.L.R.).
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the discriminatory fallout of an AVC which, at the end of the day, addressed
future conduct in general terms and omitted any redress provisions.21' There
is little to suggest on its face that such an AVC leaves the supplier at a com-
petitive disadvantage.
Take the reverse case in which an Aamco dealer argues that the terms
being sought in the injunctive proceeding exceed the restraints imposed on a
Cottman dealer in an AVC accepted by the Director with the result that
Aamco, complying with the conditions imposed, could not compete on equal
terms with Cottman. This precise issue was argued before the Supreme Court
of British Columbia in 1977 in Stubbe v. P. F. Collier & Son Ltd.P21 The
"fallacy" of this assertion, Mr. Justice Aikens held, "is that the AVC is not a
licence to [the signing party] to engage in specific unlawful acts or practices
not in terms prohibited thereby."213 Ultimately, the decision to enjoin the
defendant supplier on the terms requested is a discretionary decision and the
"only discrimination is that [the defendant], if the injunction is granted, may
be dealt with more expeditiously in respect to specific unlawful practices than
[the AVC company]." 214
These comments are not meant to minimize the practical difficulties of
proceeding to restrain practices felt to be widespread in a very competitive
industry. Those problems, however, are not restricted to administrative pro-
ceedings. Nor is the prospect of discriminatory results an appropriate reason to
decline enforcement or, in turn, to shelve employment of the AVC as a viable
choice by the Director. In the absence of an authority to convene rulemaking
procedures for specific trades or industries, 215 the present legislation calls for
the consistent application of clearly stated enforcement procedures and priori-
ties. Where industry-wide enforcement is contemplated, every consideration
should be given to securing uniform and concurrent voluntary corrective ac-
This passage highlights the Director's dilemma (and frustration) in utilizing the cease
and desist power in the absence of a comprehensive industry-wide trade rule. The
problem with this line of business activity, as a cursory analysis of the B.C. cases will
confirm and as the Cottman A VC, supra note 65 reflects, is in the total system of
merchandising employed. Specific, finely tuned, particularized instances of unfair prac-
tices admittedly only nibble away at the larger target. However, to borrow the Director's
1977 words (text accompanying note 74, supra), several such proposed orders under
s. 6 or s. 7 (immediate compliance to protect public safety) might have yielded the
"building blocks" prior to more ambitious "system-oriented" enforcement efforts. Yet,
the Divisional Court's interpretation of specificity betrays an unfortunately rigid and
unnecesarily high standard of specificity if the remedial purposes of this consumer
protection legislation are to be realized.
211 Cottman agreed to follow specific disclosure and repair practices, to handle
complaints expeditiously and to inform its franchisees and licensees of the AVC term-
Quaere, the effect of the AVC on Cottman affiliates in any event. Redress was not
involved. All in all, quite an innocuous document.
2 1 2 Stubbe, supra note 171, at 637 (D.L.R.), 531-32 (W.W.R.), 249 (C.P.R.).
213 Id. at 638 (D.L.R.), 532 (W.W.R.), 250 (C.P.R.).
214 Id. at 638 (D.L.R.), 533 (W.W.R.), 250 (C.P.R.).
21
5 See generally Mullan, Rule-Making Hearings: A General Statute for Ontario?
(Toronto: Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy, 1979).
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tion applicable to all members of the subject group.216 That choice, if exer-
cised, leaves open the option of more formal action as laid out in the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The mixed results of this initial review of Canada's AVC experience
should not come as a surprise or revelation for they correspond very closely
to the general administrative profile identified with market practices legislation
in Canada. Little wonder that the newest enforcement option is still regarded
in many quarters as an idea more than slightly ahead of its time.
The ninety compliance agreements since the advent of the use of AVC's
appear as an uneven, often erratic experience. In the face of the continuing
favour with the remedy in the U.K. and in its several forms in the U.S., our
record in this country covers the entire spectrum: from slumber, apprehen-
sions of bureaucratic duress, vows of administrative celibacy and second
doubts, to unbridled enthusiasm and imaginative application. It would appear
that the common legislative roots have had little impact on the employment of
the AVC as a significant administrative remedy in marketing practices regu-
lation.
216 Cf. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (C.C.H.) 9591, at 17,092-93:
Special consideration is given by the Commission to the possibility of utilizing
the voluntary compliance procedure in dealing with acts or practices which are
being engaged in by a number of competing firms, where competitive inequities
might be created by proceeding separately on a case-by-case basis, and where
the acts or practices are not otherwise of such a gravity as to require orders to
cease and desist.
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TABLE I
ALBERTA ASSURANCES OF VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE*
January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1980
No. Supplier Activity Comments
1 Shoe retailer Alleged "half-price sale"-prior Cease and desist; refund to
to "sale", normal retail price complainant.
raised by one-third
2 Sporting goods Sale "up to 75% off"--compet- Corrective advertising to aver-
retailer itor complaint-largest discount age sale discount of 50%.
57% in fact
3 Auto dealer Took down payment for pur- Car sold at bargained for price
chase of used car-subsequent plus payment of all legal fees-
claim of demolition in accident standard compliance undertak-
to evade sale--car in fact under- ing.
sold
4 "Warehouse" Advertising "Buy direct and Agreement to cease practice;
furniture save" claims-in fact, standard prior approval of advertising
retailer retailer format by Director required.
5 Building siding Brochure claims re price, fac- Withdrawal of brochure-Di-
contractor tory trained staff, fire resistant rector's approval required for
products, etc-all claims mis- new brochure.
leading
6 Direct seller Telephone "consumer survey"- Stop practice; provide Director
of vacuums misleading statement of pur- with copies of all sales promo-
pose of solicitation tional material; clear identifica-
tion of caller and purpose of
call at outset agreed to.
7 Figure or $2.00 treatment advertised-in Undertaking to cease ads; equal
weight reducing fact, only available if term con- prominence to be given to total
salon tract signed price.
8 National drug Misleading Manufacturer's Sug- Apology ad in newspaper; new
retailer gested List price claims sale of items at cost or less.
9 Home renovator Unconscionable sales tactics in- $21,000 worth of contracts
and building volving elderly homeowners cancelled, $5,000 in down pay-
supplies dealer ments returned; cease high pres-
sure sales tactics.
10 Auto dealer Classified ads to sell "repos- Cease and desist undertaking.
sessed" cars--claimed to be
private seller
11 Weight Alleged benefits of treatments Refunds to consumer complain-
reducing salon -unsubstantiated ants; promise to cease advertis-
ing, any similar benefit or result
claims, etc.
12 Physical "2 for 1" membership fee offer Agreement to cease claims.
fitness centre -claimed single membership
fee misleading
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TABLE I (cont.)
No. Supplier Activity Comments
13 Appliance "Free draws" yielding "credit Promotion discontinued; one
dealer vouchers" to be deducted from week later retailer closed doors
"regularly advertised price"- -Director obtained Freezing
no such price in trading area; Order per s. 9 on cash and
dishonoured "satisfaction" guar- goods worth $30,000, later va-
antee cated in favour of $10,000 trust
to satisfy complaints.
14 Household Estimate - claimed amount Reimbursement of difference
movers "materially more than initial between original estimate and
estimate" upon delivery, other- claimed amount plus additional
wise refused to unload goods sum for inconvenience.
15 Mobile home 1968 model represented know- $700 reimbursement plus $200
vendor ingly to be 1972 model investigation costs to Director;
standard claims re cessation of
practice, etc.
16 Auto dealer "Demonstrator" claim-in fact, Consumer complainant com-
lease unit put back into inven- pensated; portion of Director's
tory; warranty coverage repre- investigation costs paid.
sentation untrue
17 Appliance Inflated "regular selling price" Customer reimbursement; pay-
retailer offset claimed savings from ment of Director's investigation
credit coupon promotion costs; practice stopped.
18 Direct seller "Survey" contacts by sales re- Customers reimbursed; costs of
of cutlery presentatives; discount claims investigation paid.
and cookware misleading
19 Plumbing sup- Unnecessary repairs Replacement of parts; payment
plies retailer for inconvenience; cover Di-
rector's investigation costs.
20 Sporting goods False "regular" price advertise- Ads discontinued; compliance
retailer ments-"sale price" really reg- undertaking; payment of Di-
uar price rector's investigation costs.
21 General Motors Chevrolet engines substituted in Extended warranty and $200
of Canada Ltd. other GM automobiles-prac- rebate to affected car buyers;
tice undisclosed contribution towards Director's
costs of investigation.
22 Weight Unsubstantiated body wrap Cease and desist; agreement to
reducing salon claims reimburse all costs to any con-
sumers complaining about ser-
vices; payment of portion of
investigation costs.
23 Shoe retailer Price claims, also purported 1 Undertaking to stop claims and
sale for second pair-in fact, contribute towards costs of in-
only selected inventory on sale vestigation.
24 Auto dealer 1972 model sold as 1974 Customer reimbursement plus
costs of investigation to Direc-
tor.
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TABLE I (cont.)
No. Supplier Activity Comments
25 Auto dealer Misrepresentation of mileage Compensation to four custom-
on four autos ers; payment of Director's
costs of investigation.
26 Dance studio "Reduced price" claims for Full contractual disclosure un-
"limited time"-in fact, regular dertaken; also discontinuance
price of advertising claims.
*SOURCE: 26 AVC "summaries" provided by the Director of Trade Practices from a
total of 43 AVC's accepted to the end of 1980 since proclamation of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act, on Jan. 1, 1976. Based on fiscal year periods
(except for 1980), the breakdown is as follows:
Jan. 1, 1976 - Mar. 31, 1976 - 3
Apr. 1, 1976 - Mar. 31, 1977 - 10
Apr. 1, 1977 - Mar. 31, 1978 - 3
Apr. 1, 1978 - Mar. 31, 1979 - 4
Apr. 1, 1979 - Dec. 31, 1980 - 23
TOTAL 43
per Director of Trade Practices, Jan. 21, 1981 and Annual Reports for the
years in question.
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TABLE II
B.C. ASSURANCES OF VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE*
July 1974 to December 31, 1980
No. Date Supplier Activity Comments
1 Aug. 15/74 Empress Allabout Advertising length Refund offer made available;
Tours Ltd. of tours advertising corrected and to
be submitted for compliance
for next six months.
2 Nov. 27/74 Dollar Rent a Disclosure of Refunds to 40 customers of
Car Ltd. mileage surcharge record; advertising correct-
ed; six months' compliance
programme undertaken.
3 Feb. 6/75 Airclub Interna- Disclosure of tour Complaints to be handled
tional Inc. et al. details including promptly, compliance de-
specific departure tails forthwith upon Direc-
points and ticket tor's request, advertising
surcharges clarified and to be submitted
for next two months.
4 Feb. 7/75 Imperial Oil Greater promi- Corrective notice to all card-
Limited nence to monthly holders; advertising changed.
payment than to





5 Mar 6/75 Texaco Canada Same as no. 4 Same as no. 4.
Limited
6 Mar. 11/75 Metro Toyota Representations $2,200 refund to consumer
Limited concerning "Purch- complainant advertising
a-Lease Scheme" changed; 3 months' pre-
clearance of all related ad-
vertising materials by bind-
ing decision of Director.
7 Mar. 25/75 The Traders Home "Sneak preview Corrective retailer and radio
Furnishings & sale" promotion in messages; retailer to submit
Appliances Ltd. retailer mailing all similar advertisements to




8 Apr. 1/75 Kingsway Less prominence Cessation of such advertise-
Plymouth to actual cash ments, compliance reports
Chrysler Ltd. price than to down upon request from the Di-





9 Apr. 17/75 Westminster Same as no. 8 Same as no. 8.
Chevrolet-
Oldsmobile Ltd.
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TABLE II (cont.)
No. Date Supplier Activity Comments
10 Apr. 17/75 Inter-Provincial Display of "Public Cessation of practice; corn-
Pest Control Ltd. Health Certificates" pliance reports upon re-
neither issued nor quest; pre-clearance by Di-
approved by offi- rector of any similar repre-
cial authorities sentations.
I1 May 9/75 Kingsway Fiat Same as no. 8 Same as no. 8.
Ltd.
12 June 17/75 Chrysler Credit "Notice of Inten- Compliance report upon re-
Canada Ltd. tion to sell" letters quest for next 5 years; pre-
to delinquent car clearance of all relevant
buyers alleging contract forms and notices
right to reposses- to Jan. 1, 1980; correction
sion costs and any letter to 102 customers of
deficiency after record.
resale--contrary




13 June 20/75 Sinclair Datsun Sale of used car Refund of $3,201 to con-
Sales Ltd. as new vehicle sumer buyer; future disclo-
sure promised; compliance
details upon request of Di-
rector.
14 July 23/75 Midway Distribu- Price advertising One year filing of all adver-
tors (1974) Ltd. of motorcycles tisements; cessation of prac-
tice.
15 Aug. 7/75 Glenmore Egg Representation of Cessation of practice; com-
Ranch Manitoba eggs as pliance details upon request
"B.C. Fresh- for following year.
Okanagan Finest"
16 Aug. 25/75 Can-Am Building Canadian Stan- Cessation of claims; com-
Supply Ltd. dards Association pliance details upon request




17 Sept. 23/75 Vernon Funeral Steel casket sold, Refunds of $995 to each of
Home Ltd. then repainted and the two estates; payment of
sold second time Director's investigation costs
without disclosure of $146; public record filing
of prior use expressly acknowledged (stan-
dard clause thereafter).
18 Sept. 24/75 Tuffy Muffler Ltd., Unnecessary $25 refund to consumer
formerly "Midas repairs and parts complainant; undertaking to
Muffler Shops" replacement cease practice, communica-
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TABLE II (cont.)
No. Date Supplier Activity Comments
19 Oct. 9/75 Lo-Cost Automatic "Free diagnosis" Consumer redress over
Transmission Re- ads unauthorized $1,500; payment of investi-
builders Ltd. repairs, dismantl- gation costs; cessation of
ing tactics, use of practices; compliance de-
"warranty" cards to tails upon Director's request
claim mechanic's to Jan. 1, 1977.
lien
20 Oct. 23/75 Davidson's Color Unnecessary $35 refund to consumer
Television Repair repairs complainant; compliance
Centre Ltd. promised.
21 Nov. 10/75 Memorial Gardens Brass urn sold but Discontinuance of selling
(B.C.) Ltd. et al. not used as urns for burial of cremated
represented remains; series of compli-
ance reporting undertakings.
22 Dec. 3/75 Comor Sports "Regular"/"sale" 5 point price advertising
Centre Ltd. price advertising undertaking; compliance de-
claims tails upon Director's request
to Oct. 1/77.
23 Dec. 16/75 Apt. Distributors Price claims in $2,000 investigation costs
Ltd. "Close-Out" sale paid; 10% refund offer to
of inventory of bona fide customers claiming
other furniture to and approved by Depart-
retailer--"was"/ ment; / page apology no-
"now" claims tice in Sat. first news section
of two Vancouver dailies.
24 Jan. 8/76 Associates Finan- Misleading Corrective notice to all af-
cial Services Ltd. deficiency claim fected customers plus reim-
notices contra bursement of any actual pay-
Conditional Sales ments; submission of all
Act governing contract and notice forms to
"seize or sue" Jan. 1, 1980 upon Director's
limitations request.
25 Jan. 27/76 John Barnes Car dealer identity $680 refund to consumer
Wholesaler undisclosed in complainant; compliance
classified ads; with Trade Practices Act
misleading repre- and Motor Vehicle Act; sub-
sentations as to mission of classified ads and
condition of autos contract forms upon Direc-
tor's request to Jan. 1, 1978.
26 Feb. 19/76 S.S. Kresge Corn- Resale of used, Full disclosure promised;
pany Limited returned appliances submission of all advertising
(K Mart Depart- as new stock of previously sold articles in
ment Stores) advance to Director to Jan.
1, 1978; "used tag" attached
in Schedule A as procedure
to be followed.
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TABLE II (cont.)
No. Date Supplier Activity Comments
27 Feb. 26/76 Maclean-Hunter Alleged misleading $10,000 Trust Agreement
Ltd. sales pitches by estabished to furnish corn-
door-to-door pliance security in event of
vendors selling "pattern of conduct"inbreach
magazine sub- of AVC for next 3 years;
scriptions, parti- $1,000 paid to contribute to
cularly re purpose investigation costs and costs
of solicitation and of Supreme Court injunc-
seller identity tion proceeding previously
launched by Director, now
withdrawn; submission of all
promotional kits and mate-
rials within 48 hours of in-
ception of use; substantia-
tion of any claims therein
within 45 days upon Direc-
tor's demand.
28 Apr. 15/76 WorldBook-Child- See AVC. no. 27 Disclosure of purpose of
craft of Canada encyclopedia visit, vendor identity and
Ltd. sales scheme contract terms undertaken;
compliance programme of
submission of materials, etc.
to Jan. 1, 1978.
29 May 18/76 Balmere Automo- Series of alleged Undertaking to comply with
tive Enterprises misleading repair Act and not engage in any
Ltd. and Gregory practices-auto- of cited practices.
Balmere (Mister matic trans-
Transmission missions, bait and




30 Nov. 24/76 Shell Canada Ltd. Greater promi- Corrective notice to all af-
nence to monthly fected customers.
payments than to
cash price in credit
card customer
mailing
31 Jan. 17/77 A-1 Handyman Home repair con- Payment of investigation
Industries Ltd. & tract form clause costs plus Director's legal
Heinz Kehrli waived Consumer costs on party and party
Protection Act basis of withdrawal of inter-
im injunction action.
32 Feb. 1/77 Impala Industries Sale of used tent- Undertaking to cease prac-
Ltd. trailer as new unit tice.
33 Feb. 22/77 Bill Docksteader Sale of autos pre- Standard form notice pre-
Motors Ltd. & W. viously substan- scribed for all damaged car
H. Docksteader tially damaged sales; Director's action with-
without disclosing drawn on payment of party
damage; mislead- and party legal costs.
ing mileage claim
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No. Date Supplier Activity Comments
34 Mar. 21/77 The Racquet Club Membership fees General compliance terms.
of Victoria advertising claims
35 Apr. 11/77 Grolier Ltd. Door-to-door Cease and desist undertak-
encyclopedia ing, particularly re full dis-
sales practices cosure of identity of vendor,
purpose of call; municipal
licencing requirements ac-
knowledged; compliance de-
tails to Aug. 1, 1978.
36 July 18/77 Bill's Mobile Sale of non-CSA Compliance undertaken; re-
Homes Ltd. approved mobile pair of unit to official stan-
home; non-disclo- dards prior to Aug. 1, 1977.
sure of material
fact
37 Apr. 28/78 North Shore Membership fees' Admission of non-compli-
Capilano Recrea- advertising claims ance (first such clause).
tion Society
38 Sept. 19/80 Scottish Inns of Promotion of Acknowledgement of failure
America Ltd. "Time-sharing" to comply with Trade Prac-
vacation in U.S.- tice Act and Consumer Pro-
solicitation and tection Act; agreement to re-
contract practices vise contract re disclosure of
cancellation right under C.P.
Act, applicability of B.C.
law; refund procedures clar-
ified; compliance with Credit
Reporting Act and Travel
Agents Act.
39 Jan. 6/81 The Aloha Group See AVC No. 38 No acknowledgement or ad-
(AVC given Inc. mission of statutory breach.
by supplier Specific terms similar to
on Dec.1/80) AVC no. 38.
*SOURCE: Record of AVC's maintained pursuant to s. 4(e)(iii), Trade Practice Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, proclaimed July, 1974.
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ONTARIO ASSURANCES OF VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE*
May 1, 1975 to December 31, 1980
No. Date Supplier Activity Comments
1 Aug. 27/77 Cashbak Inter- Cash discount Undertakings including
national Inc. promotion $1,000 security to settle con-
sumer claims per Director's
binding decision for one
year period.
2 Jan. 30/76 Phoenix Publish- Book, magazine & Assurances tied to number
ing Co. Ltd. et al. encyclopedia of unfair practices cited in
sales promotions s. 2(a) and (b); posting of
$1,000 security to settle con-
sumer claims per Director's
binding decision for one
year period.
3 Feb. 25/76 Trans-World N/A Entire public record as fol-
Dance Studio lows:
"Cease and Desist s. 7 Order
issued December 30, 1975
Disposed of by Agreement
February 25, 1976.
The Public Record is com-
posed of THIS DOCU-
MENT ONLY."
4 Jan. 5/77 Don Mills Circus ticket Agreement to disclose full,
Jaycees et al. solicitation proper affiliation/sponsor-
scheme ship in future ticket selling
activities.
5 May 10/76 Vic Tanny Fitness Fitness salon Two day cancellation right
Ltd. et al. advertising and undertaken; expeditious han-
personal sales dling of complaints prom-
activities ised plus submission of com-
pliance reports to Director.
6 Sept. 22/76 Rockwood Direct and mail Agreement to specific ad-
Gardens Ltd. order sales of vertising practices, the hir-
plants, shrubs, ing of qualified expert staff,
seeds, etc. refunds if out of stock, etc.
Sales system open to moni-
toring at Director's option.
7 Sept. 3/77; United Institute Selling private Undertaking to refrain from
Supple- Educational school courses government approval claims;
mentary Services to change standard contract
AVC, Aug. to permit two day cancella-
2, 1979 tion right; monitoring cap-
acity of Director acknowl-
edged.
1981]
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No. Date Supplier Activity Comments
8 Dec. 14/78 Cottman Trans- Advertising and Undertaking to recited dis-
missions repair/service closure and repair practices,
(Canada) practices involving prompt handling of corn-
Limited auto transmission plaints and communication
Activity systems and parts of AVC to each Cottman
franchisee and licensee. First
acknowledgement of filing
on public record. No specific
redress.
*SOURCE: Record of AVC's and Cease Orders maintained per s. 5(c), Business
Practices Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131, proclaimed May 1, 1975.
